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This dissertation explores the comparative ability of states – via state judiciaries, state 
legislatures, and direct democracy – to lead mass public opinion on homosexuality through the 
adoption of gay rights policies.  I consider four potential attitudinal consequences from public 
policy – legitimation (policy and opinion move in the same direction), backlash (policy and 
opinion move in opposite directions), polarization (policy splits opinion), and no relationship 
(policy has no influence on opinion) – proposing that state courts are better suited to lead 
homosexuality attitudes than state legislatures.  I further hypothesize that a number of state 
characteristics condition the relationship between public policy and public opinion.  
My results show that the mere existence of policy, regardless of its source, changes how 
citizens feel regarding homosexuality.  Specific to state institutions, my results indicate that state 
legislatures lead public opinion, direct democracy does not lead public opinion, and the results 
with respect to courts are inconclusive, requiring more research before determining their opinion 
leadership power.  In most cases analyzed herein, policy induces public opinion regarding 
homosexuality to move in the same direction as the policy adoption, serving to legitimize public 
opinion.  This legitimation consequence of policy is a tremendous revelation not noted in the 
state politics literature heretofore.  Citizens may not even need to be aware of a policy’s 
existence; rather, through repeated exposure to the policy and its direct (e.g., banishing 
discrimination against gay and lesbian citizens) and indirect effects (e.g., gays and lesbians more 
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willing to “come out” due to greater legal protections), citizen feelings become more positive 
toward homosexuality. 
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PREFACE 
It’s now been over 12 years since I first set foot on Clemson University’s campus as an 
optimistic, anxious, and terrified freshman.  At that point, I was a young and naïve girl from the 
City of Pittsburgh who’d had an interesting and often tumultuous upbringing.  I was the first 
from my dad’s side of the family to attend college and the first on either side of my family to 
leave the comfortable sanctuary of our beloved hometown for academic pursuit.  I had no idea 
what to expect; the truth is that I didn’t know many people who went to college.  At some point 
that first year, I met a political science major.  I remember thinking that he seemed so smart and 
that I needed to take a political science course so that I could have “intelligent conversations” 
about politics with friends and family.  It was this desire that brought me to Laura Olson, my 
teacher, my role model, and now, my friend.  I had no idea what I wanted to do with my life but I 
knew I wanted to be like Dr. Olson.  I am forever indebted to her for her guidance and 
encouragement. 
After many classes and conversations with Laura, I became a political science major and 
ended up at the University of Pittsburgh thanks in part to her support of me.   Since arriving at 
Pitt in the fall of 2005, I’ve been incredibly fortunate to meet amazing scholars who have 
become friends.  I’d like to thank the Department of Political Science at the University of 
Pittsburgh for the ongoing support of me and my academic endeavours.  I would like to thank 
xiii 
Steve Finkel, Martin Greenberg, and Jon Hurwitz for serving on my committee and for their 
thoughtful feedback on my work throughout this very long process.  In particular, I would like to 
thank my dissertation advisor, Susan Hansen, for her guidance, patience, and compassion.  I’d 
also like to thank Dr. Carl Lieberman and Susan Hansen for the financial support necessary to 
obtain the data used in this dissertation. 
At numerous points over the years, the dissertation seemed so big and I felt so 
inadequate.  I’d like to thank the following people for providing support in a variety of ways 
including revising my chapters, listening to me vent, and providing emotional support: Kathleen 
Morouse, Jeff Morouse, Aaron Abbarno, Galina Zapryanova, LJ Zigerell, Caitlin Dwyer Jewitt, 
Heather Elko McKibben, Logan Dancey, Heather Frederick, Dave Kershaw, Amy Erica Smith, 
and Traci Nelson. 
Finally, I would like to thank my person and my love, Chris W. Bonneau.  You believed 
in me when I didn’t believe in myself, constantly reminding me to keep my eye on the prize and 
look for the light at the end of the tunnel, no matter how faint it appears.  Through it all, you 
have been my constant source of strength, peace, and happiness.  Thank you for helping me 
through the good days, the bad days, and all the ones in between. 
 1 
1.0 INTRODUCTION 
President Dwight Eisenhower routinely cautioned against changing “people’s hearts merely by 
laws” (Parmet 1998, 510) when talking about the possible effects of integration on the political 
attitudes of racists.  While this may be true in the strictest sense, government can, however, 
legislate the conditions under which attitudes exist.  Changing the political environment in which 
attitudes are formed, maintained, and altered can have long lasting impacts on political attitudes.  
The mere exposure theory, rooted in social psychology, argues that individuals are influenced by 
the world around them – both explicitly and implicitly – and develop a preference for the stimuli 
to which they have been repeatedly exposed.  Simply by living and working in their 
communities, citizens are repeatedly exposed to policies and, therefore, the priorities and 
preferences of their state government, a mechanism through which the government can lead 
public opinion.  
Political science research indicates that some institutions of government may be better 
suited to lead public opinion than others (Hoekstra 1995; Gibson, Caldeira, and Spence 2003; 
Bartels and Mutz 2009).  Scholarship on the institutional opinion leadership ability of the federal 
institutions finds that the Supreme Court can lead public opinion (Baas and Thomas 1984; 
Hoekstra 1995; Gibson, Caldeira, and Spence 2003) and Congress may be able to lead public 
opinion (Bartels and Mutz 2009).  For example, Bartels and Mutz (2009) find that the Supreme 
Court’s ability to lead mass opinion is “potent” and “based on multiple processes of persuasive 
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influence” (249).  Specifically, they find that the Supreme Court can move public opinion 
“regardless of people’s sophistication levels, levels of issue relevant thinking, or the presence of 
issue relevant arguments” (259).  Bartels and Mutz (2009) further find that Congress can lead the 
public opinion of the less sophisticated segment of society by inducing them to think of 
arguments that support Congress’ position.  The authors note that while Congress’ ability to lead 
public opinion is conditional, the relationship is “surprisingly more potent” than previously 
believed (249).  While most scholars find that Congress is a poor institutional leader (e.g., 
Hoekstra 1995), Bartels and Mutz find support for Congress’ persuasive ability.  
Existing studies of institutional persuasion focus almost solely on the United States 
Supreme Court (e.g., Baas and Thomas 1984; Hoekstra and Segal 1996; Mondak 1990), with 
very little existing work on the other federal institutions (e.g., Bartels and Mutz 2009; Hoekstra 
1995) and no existing work on state institutions.  That is, few studies – with the exception of 
Bartels and Mutz (2009) – have explicitly considered the comparative persuasive capacity of 
different political institutions, either nationally or sub-nationally.  Although most of the 
scholarship on institutional opinion leadership has focused on the Supreme Court (Brickman and 
Peterson 2006; Clawson, Kegler, and Waltenburg 2001; Hoekstra 2003; Stoutenborough, Haider-
Markel, and Allen 2006; Hoekstra and Segal 1996), there is no reason to assume that the highest 
court in the United States is the only institution capable of moving the public, especially in light 
of Bartels and Mutz’s (2009) finding that Congress is able to move public opinion.  If Congress 
and the Supreme Court are able to shift public opinion toward their positions, it is possible that 
state institutions may be better suited to move their residents since most policy that affects the 
day-to-day lives of Americans is adopted at the state and local level. 
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How do states lead public opinion?  Is each institution of government equally capable of 
leading opinion?  This dissertation attempts to answer these questions by exploring the capacity 
of state institutions to lead public opinion on the specific issue of gay rights.  Since states often 
serve as laboratories for testing different policies, studying opinion leadership in the states can 
help scholars determine if, when, and how elites are able to shift public opinion.   The topic of 
gay rights is an optimal case study for researching the policy-opinion linkage because gay rights 
are considered one of, if not the most, visible policy areas for the public (Mooney and Lee 1995).  
Since issues of gay rights are so visible, it is widely assumed that politicians must directly follow 
their constituency opinion when crafting gay rights legislation (Mooney and Schuldt 2008).  If 
institutional adoption of policies can shift mass opinion on gay rights, then institutions might be 
able to lead mass opinion in other less visible policy areas as well.  
Public opinion on gay rights has changed dramatically since 1980.  Additionally, state 
gay rights policies have proliferated in recent years,
1
 with some state institutions taking
decidedly positive positions, other state institutions taking distinctly negative positions, and yet 
other states taking no position whatsoever.  The variance in policy positions and opinions on gay 
rights issues is another reason why gay rights is an optimal policy area for researching the 
comparative capacity of political institutions to lead public opinion. 
The rest of this introductory chapter is devoted to setting the foundation for the 
dissertation by detailing the extant scholarship regarding the basic relationship between public 
opinion and public policy. In presenting this scholarship, three models of the relationship 
between opinion and policy are outlined – (1) policy follows opinion, (2) policy leads opinion, 
and (3) policy and opinion simultaneously influence one another.  Since the assumption that 
1
 In 1973, only one state (Maryland) had a gay-specific policy regarding the definition of marriage.  As of 2013, 
every state currently has at least one gay-specific policy regarding a wide range of topics including discrimination 
protection, hate crime protection, adoption by gay couples, and marriage definitions. 
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policy should respond to constituent demand is the bedrock of representative democracy, most 
research has focused on the first and third models of relationship.  Much less research has 
focused on the reverse relationship – policy leads opinion.  It is my goal to speak to this second 
model of the relationship between policy and opinion, and my research demonstrates support for 
the impact of state policy on opinion. 
1.1 MODELS OF PUBLIC POLICY-PUBLIC OPINION LINKAGE 
Scholars have long been interested in the relationship between public opinion and policy outputs.  
Three models of the nature of the relationship exist: (1) a majoritarian model in which public 
opinion influences the adoption of congruent policies, (2) a legitimacy model in which public 
policy moves public opinion to be congruent with the policy, allowing institutions to serve as 
opinion leaders and (3) a reciprocal model in which public opinion and public policy influence 
one another throughout the course of time and institutions can serve as opinion leaders only 
some of the time.  These three models of public opinion-public policy linkage vary widely in 
their assumptions about democracy and the ability of Americans to validly dictate the direction 
of policy as well as institutions’ ability to lead public opinion.   
1.1.1 Theory 1: Public Opinion Influences Policy Adoption 
Miller and Stokes (1963) provide the foundation for the scholarly research on policy 
responsiveness and a whole body of research exists detailing that institutions and policy respond 
to the direction and intensity of public opinion at the national level (e.g., Stimson, Mackuen, and 
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Erikson 1995).  Many state politics scholars have affirmed the national-level finding that 
linkages exist between opinion and policy.  For instance, Wright, Erikson, and McIver (1987) 
find evidence that state ideology is reflected in the general policy liberalism of states.  Further, 
Hill and Leighley (1992) demonstrate a link between public opinion and the overall policy 
outputs of state legislatures such that the more liberal the public, the more liberal the policy 
adopted by the legislature.  Focusing on policy-specific public opinion on the adoption of gay 
rights policies in the states, Lax and Phillips (2009) find a high degree of policy responsiveness 
to public opinion on a range of eight different gay rights policies.  That is, opinion about gay 
marriage influenced the adoption of gay marriage policies.  
All of the above studies assume that the United States is a responsive democracy.  In a 
responsive democracy, public opinion should have a positive influence on policy change.  That 
is, public opinion and policy should move in the same direction, ideally with policy responding 
to demands from the public.  While not requiring an exact one-to-one relationship between 
public opinion and policy, there should be consistency between public opinion and public policy 
within a range that the public finds acceptable (Sharp 1999).  Public opinion, therefore, “serves 
as a key constraint on governmental action, rather than a causal agent for governing outcomes” 
(Sharp 1999, 21), with elections serving as the chief connection between the masses and the 
elites (e.g., Mayhew 1974; Fiorina 1981; Miller and Stokes 1963).   
The presence of elections can lead to electoral turnover or political expediency.  Electoral 
turnover occurs when elites deviate from what the majority of the public demands.  Voters 
recognize that their representative is not heeding their demands and votes him or her out of office 
in favor of someone who will vote in line with their own preferences.  Political expediency (or 
responsiveness) occurs when elected officials learn of changes in public opinion and then match 
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their policy positions to their constituents’ positions – that is, they pander to public opinion.  
Both electoral turnover and political expediency help to explain the basic relationship between 
public opinion and policy (Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson 2002) when assuming that the 
ultimate goal of policy is accurate representation of constituencies.  
1.1.2 Theory 2: Public Policies Influence Public Opinion  
Beginning with Edmund Burke and continued by political science scholars (e.g., Lippman 1922; 
Zaller 1992; Dye 2001), some have argued that public opinion responds to broad elite cues, 
allowing politicians and institutions to act as opinion leaders.  Elite opinion leadership rests upon 
the assumption that elites are better able to produce an outcome that benefits society at-large 
(Dye 2001).  Democracy, with its focus on majority rule, can sometimes block out minority 
viewpoints and so elites step in to protect certain segments of the population.  
Jacobs and Shapiro (2000), among others (e.g., Stimson 1991; Zaller 1992), find that 
public opinion responds to policy through the media and political elites’ transmission of the 
rhetoric and discourse surrounding the policy at hand.  Zaller (1992) states that elites can in fact 
lead mass opinion of the moderately politically aware, but only if the elites are polarized on the 
issue.  Further, scholars have found evidence that newspaper and television exposure influences 
opinions at both the individual (Bartels 1993; Mutz and Martin 2001) and aggregate levels 
(MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson 1992).  While the public may not know policy specifics, it is 
informed enough to comprehend the direction and scope of the change – particularly if the policy 
at hand involves a politically visible issue (Page and Shapiro 1992; Erikson, Wright, and McIver 
2006) – and update their attitudes accordingly.  
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Additionally, public opinion responds to policy changes as citizens personally experience 
the effects of those policy changes.  In their long-term study of the relationship between policy 
and opinion, Page and Shapiro (1983) acknowledge that policy may have affected opinion in 
almost half of their cases.  Dye (2001) argues that public policy in the United States does not 
result from the will of the people but rather elite consensus.  In essence, Dye argues that policy 
originates from the top and trickles down to the masses.  He further argues that elites play the 
role of opinion leader, telling the masses how to feel about policies.  Dye, therefore, maintains 
that the arrow runs from policy to mass opinion formation or more specifically from elites to 
media to government officials and the mass public. 
A whole body of literature on issue evolution revolves around the basic assumption that 
elites lead the social-centered opinions of citizens.  Pioneered by Carmines and Stimson (1990), 
the central tenet of the issue evolution framework is that an issue can only be “evolved” if elite 
opinion first crystallizes and then polarizes on an issue.  Then, the masses follow the elites, 
sorting themselves out based on the issue.  Carmines and Stimson (1990) determine that civil 
rights and race opinions epitomize issue evolution: elites formed opinions, took positions and 
made policy.  Then, the masses followed the elite cues and, on the whole, their attitudes warmed 
toward African-Americans.   Further, Adams (1997) finds that abortion represents another area 
of issue evolution, with masses following elites – especially the courts.  Additionally, Lindaman 
and Haider-Markel (2002) analyze several culture wars issues to determine whether any of the 
specific topics under the gay rights umbrella fit the issue evolution framework.  Looking at the 
relationship between policy-specific opinion and policy adoption, they determine that while 
elites have polarized on policy issues, the masses have not wholly followed suit just yet.  In a 
clear rebuttal of Lindaman and Haider-Markel (2002), Egan and Persily (2009) find that while 
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pro-gay court decisions initially led to slightly more hostile public opinion regarding 
homosexuality and gay rights issues, a legitimizing effect emerged in 2005 and public opinion 
has grown increasingly favorable toward gays and their civil rights.  Egan and Persily (2009) 
also observe that the citizens in states where pro-gay rulings have been decided have more 
positive opinions about gay marriage than citizens in states where anti-gay decisions have been 
handed down.  Furthermore, citizens in states whose courts have not decided gay issues have less 
favorable opinions about gay marriage, on average, by about 10% than citizens in states with 
either a pro-gay or anti-gay court ruling. 
1.1.3 Theory 3: Reciprocal Relationship  
Another set of scholars suggests that a dynamic relationship likely exists between policy and 
public opinion (e.g., Stimson, MacKuen, and Erikson 1995; Wlezien 1995; Soroka and Wlezien 
2005) such that public opinion and public policy influence each other.  Johnson, Brace, and 
Arceneaux (2005) argue that a reciprocal relationship exists between policy and opinion such 
that individual opinions on the environment are influenced by the environmental conditions in 
which the respondent lives, while those opinions are also responsive to policy outputs and the 
respondents’ perception of improved environmental conditions.  Further, Pacheco (2009) 
analyzes the relationship between attitudes and education and welfare spending, finding that state 
attitudes towards education spending are positively related to per pupil spending in the short run 
and state attitudes towards welfare spending are positively related to AFDC benefits in both the 
short- and long-run.  She concludes that, “public opinion and policy exhibit a significant reactive 
relationship over time at the sub-national level” (22).  Additionally, Norrander (2000) cites the 
existence of an historical chain model of capital punishment policies such that “past opinion and 
  9 
past policy in some way shape current opinion and current policy” (777).  Using a path 
dependency model, she finds a “causal chain of interrelationships between opinion and policy” 
(786) such that opinion has an effect on policy in the short term but that prior policies affect 
opinion in the long run, indicating a reciprocal relationship that is constantly in flux. 
Specific to gay rights policies, Brewer (2008, 4) seeks to explain “how the politics of gay 
rights has shaped public opinion and how public opinion has shaped the politics of gay rights” in 
the book Value War: Public Opinion and the Politics of Gay Rights.  He argues that during the 
period of 1990-2006 the public debate over gay rights by elites – policymakers, mass media, 
religious authorities, and interest group leaders – led public opinion on homosexuality and gay 
rights by supplying so-called “opinion recipe” frames (Kinder and Sanders 1996) to the mass 
public.  These frames give the public recommendations for how a topic should be understood 
which, in turn, the masses use when evaluating questions of homosexuality and gay rights.  In 
this way, he argues elites lead mass opinion on gay rights.  Moreover, Brewer argues that once 
public opinion shifted to the left on (in support of) gay rights, elites were then forced to alter 
their message in order to comply more closely with what the public demanded.  In this way, the 
politics of gay rights simultaneously shaped public opinion and was shaped by public opinion. 
1.1.4 Limitations of Existing Literature  
Scholars have long been interested in the relationship between public policy and public opinion, 
largely with an eye toward explaining the extent to which the relationship embodies the ideals of 
representative democracy.  While valuable information was gleaned from all of the studies 
discussed in the previous sections, they suffer from several shortcomings that severely limit the 
conclusions to be drawn from them.  The first drawback is that these studies on the public policy-
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public opinion linkage overlook the fact that policy specialists target institutions based on the 
expected policy outcome (policy adopted or defeated).  Policy can be initiated in multiple state 
institutional venues – the legislature, the judiciary, or with interest groups and the electorate 
through the ballot initiative process – and each of these venues could have significant 
consequences for their impact on public opinion.  
Second, with the exception of Lax and Phillips (2009; 2012) and Pacheco (2009), these 
studies cannot, and do not, make causal claims about the relationship between public policy and 
public opinion due to methodological restrictions.  Their overwhelming reliance on cross-
sectional data, which includes only one data point for every respondent in a single year or a short 
time series, does not allow for conclusive evidence regarding the nature of the relationship 
between public opinion and public policy.  In order to draw such conclusions, researchers need 
to have multiple data points for each respondent at different periods of time, often spanning 
many years so as to pick up any meaningful change in opinion and the corresponding change in 
policy.  Instead, many of these studies assume that the causal arrow runs from public opinion to 
public policy because of their reliance on the responsive democracy and representation literature.  
While Lax and Phillips (2009, 2012) and Pacheco (2009) are the exception in that they use 
advanced methodological techniques such as hierarchical linear modeling and detailed analyses 
of variance to draw their causal claims, neither explicitly test for reverse causation.  
The third shortcoming of the existing literature is that many of the studies mentioned 
above analyze data at the national level while the debate over most of these policies is waged at 
the state level.  Especially in the area of gay rights, most policies originate in (and vary by) 
states.  The recent U.S. Supreme Court case invalidating the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) 
illustrates this: while the federal law was struck down, the Court did nothing to invalidate 
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decisions by individual states regarding same-sex marriage.  State that limited marriage to a man 
and a woman still have their policies in place, despite the face that a national policy was 
invalidated. This error in analysis may mask any changes that occurred sub-nationally, 
particularly when dealing with institutional opinion leadership.  We know that Congress and the 
Supreme Court are capable of leading opinion at the federal level.  State institutions may be 
better able to lead opinion because the bulk of policy affecting the day-to-day lives of Americans 
are made at the state level and citizens are constantly exposed to the policies.  Citizen exposure 
to state policies is continual and therefore, the impact of policy on opinion may prove large.  
This dissertation represents a step forward in the political science literature because it 
accounts for policy origination points, uses multilevel modeling to more accurately reflect how 
policies are made in the U.S., and explores the public opinion-public policy linkage at the proper 
level of government – the state.   
1.2 GAY RIGHTS AND STATE POLITICS 
In this dissertation, I test my policy-driven theory of institutional opinion leading using the case 
of gay rights.  The case of gay rights is worthy of examination for a number of reasons.  First, 
gay rights policies vary widely across states and regions.  While states in the American South 
tend to have zero policies in place to protect gay citizens, states in New England tend to have 
many policies in place that protect gay citizens.  For example, Alabama, Florida, and Virginia do 
not have any policies protecting gay citizens from discrimination, or recognizing any variety of 
gay family (either through a marital union or adoption).  At the other end of the spectrum, 
Vermont, Massachusetts, and Connecticut protect gay citizens from hate crimes and 
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discrimination, allow gay families to adopt, and same-sex couples to marry.
2
  Clearly, there is 
great variation among the 50 states, which still exists despite recent court rulings.   
Second, while the bulk of state-level policies originate in the state legislature, gay rights 
policies can, and often do, originate with a number of state-level institutions: either from a case 
that rises through the state court system, from the public through a ballot initiative process, or 
from the state legislature through traditional policymaking.  The most traditional route for 
policies is through the policymaking body within states, the legislature.  Typically consisting of 
an upper and lower chamber, the policy must first be introduced into one of the chambers, voted 
on and passed by a majority in both chambers, then be presented and signed by the state 
executive, the governor.  A second route for gay rights policy adoption is through the state 
judiciary.  Citizens may bring disputes to the court system.  Some of these cases are appealed all 
the way to the state court of last resort, depending on the importance of the issue under 
consideration, and it is at this highest state court where gay rights policy is frequently “made.”  
For example, gay marriage was first established in the United States through the court system 
when the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts ruled in the 2003 Goodridge v. Department 
of Health case that the state may not deny the protections, benefits and obligations conferred by 
civil marriage to two individuals of the same sex who wish to marry.  
The third point-of-origin for many gay rights policies is from the public through the 
ballot initiative process of direct democracy.  A ballot initiative is the proposal of either a new 
law or constitutional amendment that is placed on the electoral ballot and put to a vote by the 
people of that state.  Ballot initiatives and referendums are utilized by 27 states.  Each initiative 
item reaches the ballot by a petition signed by a specified number of citizens as dictated by each 
                                                 
2
 See Table 4.1 for more explicit detail on state-level gay rights policies.   
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individual state’s constitution.  The voters in ballot initiatives and referendums are not typically 
representative of the public as a whole. 
It is through these varieties of policy venues that states serve as policy laboratories, 
testing out different policies on the same topic, oftentimes from different institutions.  The 
influence of the policy origination point and state institutions’ ability to lead opinion is the focus 
of this dissertation.  
1.3 SCHOLARLY CONTRIBUTION  
This research is situated among multiple literatures: mass politics, policy studies, and state 
politics.  Regarding mass politics, my dissertation adds a public policy dimension to the sources 
of attitude change.  Antecedents to attitude change are largely believed to originate from social 
and demographic factors, such as familial income level and education levels, but my results show 
that state political context also has an important influence on citizens’ homosexuality attitudes.   
Regarding policy studies, my dissertation shows that it is important to take the policy 
point of origin and its differing impact on attitudes into account.  That is, it is important to note 
whether a policy originates from the state legislature, state judiciary, or the ballot initiative 
process, as each of these origins has differing implications for attitude formation and leadership 
ability.  Additionally, I show that policy has very clear consequences for attitudes and public 
opinion.  Many policy analyses have focused on different types of policy and the cultural 
consequences of those policies.  For example, it is universally understood that certain policies are 
meant to curb crime, increase the welfare of society, and regulate economic conditions.  
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However, much less scholarship has focused on a secondary impact of policy: an attitudinal 
outcome of policy, which is one of the goals of this dissertation.  
Regarding state politics, this research advocates a sub-national approach to analyzing the 
policy-opinion relationship when policy varies at the state-level.  Since policies about gay rights, 
abortion, the death penalty, and education, for example, are determined at the state level, 
research focusing on public opinion surrounding these policies and their target groups in society 
should also be studied at the state level.  Furthermore, due to their centrality to American 
democracy, the relationship between public policy and public opinion has been intensely debated 
and studied in American political science research.  This dissertation’s contribution is the 
examination of state political structures and, specifically, the various routes by which public 
policy is adopted within the states.  
1.4 PLAN OF THE DISSERTATION 
The rest of my dissertation proceeds as follows.  The second chapter details the gay rights 
movement in the United States, the evolution of public opinion toward the gay community and 
their rights, and the existing explanations for the positive trajectory of public opinion.  Chapter 3 
fully details my theory of policy-driven state institutional opinion leadership that state-level 
policymaking influences the way in which citizens of the several states evaluate both 
homosexuality and gay rights.  Chapter 4 describes my research design and chapter 5 empirically 
evaluates the hypotheses laid out in Chapter 3.  Chapter 6 outlines conclusions to be drawn from 
the dissertation and suggestions for future avenues of research.  
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The results suggest that the mere existence of policy, regardless of its source, changes 
how citizens feel regarding homosexuality.  In most cases analyzed herein, policy induces public 
opinion regarding homosexuality to move in the same direction as the policy adoption, serving as 
a legitimizing agent.  This legitimation means that states can, in fact, change what is in the hearts 
of their citizens.   
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2.0 THE GAY RIGHTS MOVEMENT AND PUBLIC OPINION 
Gays and lesbians have long contributed to American politics as individuals. Unlike other 
minority groups, they have never been legally denied the right to vote, to run for elective office, 
or to hold political office – a relative egalitarianism not extended to blacks and women in the 
United States and other minority groups around the world.  This egalitarianism is largely due to 
the fact that the gay and lesbian community is an invisible minority that cannot be distinguished 
with the naked eye, unlike females and African Americans, whose minority status is usually 
obvious. 
Then, roughly forty years ago, gays and lesbians began to mobilize as a political group, 
resulting in an explosion of political participation by, and on behalf of, gays over the last several 
decades.  This development has resulted in a remarkable change in the American political 
landscape with some states embracing the gay rights movement and others shunning it.  Several 
states, such as many of those in New England, have advanced civil rights for gay citizens by 
passing a variety of anti-discrimination policies, while other states have heavily resisted 
embedding civil rights for gay citizens within the fabric of the legal protections of the state, 
including many states found in the American South.  
Parsing out the relationship between public opinion and public policy is a key component 
of evaluating the nature of representation, tolerance, and democracy in America.  In examining 
this relationship, I use the case of gay rights.  As detailed in the last chapter, the case of gay 
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rights is both unique and important for a number of reasons: issues of homosexuality and gay 
rights are typically thought of as emotionally charged visible public issues, gay rights policies 
vary widely across states and regions and public opinion on gay rights has changed dramatically 
in recent decades.  While the bulk of state-level policies originate in the state legislature, gay 
rights policies can, and often do, originate with a number of state-level institutions – the state 
court system, the ballot initiative process, or from the state legislature through traditional 
policymaking.  This chapter provides detailed background information on the history of the gay 
rights movement and the reactions of the public to that movement. 
2.1 HISTORY OF THE GAY RIGHTS MOVEMENT 
In ancient times, overwhelming evidence indicates that a wide variety of cultures—including that 
of Greece, Rome, Asia, and Native America—accepted homosexual behavior as part of the 
normal range of human activity (Aldrich 2006).  The anti-gay sentiment prevalent in the modern 
Western world has its roots in the Levitican laws of Judaism and it was not until the fifth century 
that the Catholic Church began to establish doctrine that deemed all non-procreative sexual acts, 
including homosexual sex, as heretical and sinful (Bull and Gallagher 1996).  By the late 
medieval period, ‘sodomites’ – as gays became known – had become the targets of widespread, 
organized persecution.  As Western Christian influence spread, so did the persecution of gays, 
into Africa, Asia, and ultimately to the Americas (Bull and Gallagher 1996). 
The world’s first gay rights organization, the Scientific Humanitarian Committee, was 
founded in Berlin, Germany in 1897.  Shortly thereafter, however, thousands of gay men died or 
were murdered in Nazi concentration camps during the Nazi reign in Germany (Aldrich 2006).  
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Prior to this point in time, few gays were willing to publicly fight for gay rights, but after the 
atrocities committed in Nazi Germany, gays all over the world mobilized, and multiple gay rights 
groups came into existence across the Western World, including in Great Britain, France, 
Germany, and the United States (Aldrich 2006). 
The active social movements of the 1960s around the globe, such as the anti-Vietnam war 
movement in the United States, the May 1968 insurrection in France which brought the French 
economy to a standstill, and the Women’s Liberation Movement throughout the Western world, 
inspired some gay activists to become confrontational.  The defining moment for the start of the 
wholesale gay rights movement in the United States was a three-day riot in New York City 
during June of 1969.  After years of being harassed and incarcerated for being openly 
homosexual, gay patrons at a gay bar in Greenwich Village resisted the authority of the New 
York Police Department.  This event, known as the Stonewall Inn riot, proved to be a catalyst for 
organizational efforts of gay and lesbian people across the country and the world, most of whom 
kept in line with the left-wing counter culture of the 1960s (Marcus 2002). 
The 1970s were dominated by a radical movement of protest for “gay liberation,” with 
gay and lesbian leaders abruptly demanding equal rights and equal protection for all 
homosexuals.  Although these demands were not fully achieved, 1973 proved to be a defining 
moment in the gay political movement when the American Psychiatric Association’s Board of 
Trustees voted to remove homosexuality as a mental disorder from the Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders (Smith and Haider-Markel 2002). Zaller (1992) claims this was a 
critical moment in American history since the change in elite discourse regarding homosexuality 
caused a change in media discourse that eventually served to change public views of 
homosexuality.  Zaller shows that most American media stories regarding homosexuality prior to 
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1973 (rare as they were) framed it as deviant and unusual.  After 1973, however, elites and media 
became more sympathetic to the plight of the gay and lesbian population – a sympathy that 
Zaller argues trickled down from polarized elites, through the media, to the general public.  Gays 
and lesbians were making headway in their plight for equal rights and freedoms during the 
1970s. 
The gay rights movement of the 1980s was defined by the emergence of a perplexing and 
fatal disease afflicting many gay men in Los Angeles, New York, and San Francisco.  This 
disease—later to become known as AIDS—first hit the pages of mainstream media in June 1981.  
As word spread of the rapid transmission of AIDS among gay men and as the number of deaths 
from the illness drastically increased, the gay rights movement redirected its energies from civil 
rights to AIDS awareness and prevention programs.  Once the fight for AIDS became 
institutionalized in the latter part of the 1980s, federal funds were devoted to AIDS research, 
separate foundations were created for AIDS awareness and prevention, and new life-saving 
drugs were discovered.  The gay community then turned its attention back to the broader issues 
of equal rights and protection (Marcus 2002).  Gay Americans, however, were dealt a blow by 
the Supreme Court when, in 1986, the Court ruled that anti-sodomy laws in the states were 
constitutional.  For the gay community, the brightest spot of the 1980s came in 1989 when 
Denmark became the first nation to legalize civil unions, providing Danish same-sex couples 
with most of the legal and fiscal rights granted to married couples. 
The 1990s ushered in a decade of prominence for the gay and lesbian community.  In 
1992, Democratic candidates for the presidency of the United States made gay rights a theme in 
the campaign (Marcus 2002).  The eventual winner, Bill Clinton, pledged to lift the ban on gays 
and lesbians in the military.  Although falling short of the ultimate goal, Democratic President 
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Clinton reached a compromise with congressional Republicans that became known as “Don’t 
Ask, Don’t Tell.”  This policy, while allowing for gays and lesbians to serve in the military, 
forced them to remain silent regarding their homosexuality (Don’t Tell) or else be discharged 
from service.  Additionally, superiors could not discuss or investigate military member’s sexual 
orientation, without first witnessing disallowed behaviors (Don’t Ask).3  While the adoption of
“Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” was neither a step forward nor a step back for the gay rights movement, 
gay persons once again made headway during the latter portion of the decade and into the 2000s 
when many states decriminalized homosexuality, equalized ages of consent for hetero- and 
homosexual young adults, and adopted laws protecting gays from discrimination on the job, in 
the housing market, and in life in general through hate crime legislation. 
In the 1990s, issues of discrimination protection and gays in the military took a backseat 
to more controversial issues revolving around the meaning of family.  In 1993, Hawaii’s state 
supreme court ruled that the state had failed to prove a compelling interest for banning same-sex 
marriage.
4
  Three years later, in 1996, Congress passed the Defense of Marriage Act, defining
marriage under federal law as a union between one man and one woman and declaring that no 
state needs to recognize a marriage performed in another state.
5
  Three years after the passage of
the Defense of Marriage Act, in 1999, Vermont became the first state to legally recognize civil 
unions between same-sex couples.  
3
 “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” was the United States military’s official position on gays in the military from 1993 until 
2011, when it was repealed. 
4
 While the supreme court ruled Hawaii’s policy discriminatory, they demanded further review at the lower court 
level.  After a long-fought legal battle and the Hawaii voters’ adoption of a constitutional ban on gay marriage, 
same-sex marriages were never granted in the state.  See Baehr v. Lewin: 74 Haw. 645, 852 P.2d 44 (1993) and 
Baehr v. Miike, 20371, Supreme Court of Hawaii (1999). 
5
 Part of this law was struck down by the U.S. Supreme Court in 2013 in the Windsor v. US case.  The Court held 
that the federal government could not refuse to recognize same-sex marriages validly granted in the states that allow 
for them, but the Court did not rule on the section regarding whether states that refuse to recognize gay marriage 
have to recognize gay marriages that occur in other states.  For example, if a gay couple that legally wed in Vermont 
moved to Texas, Texas would not have to recognize that marriage.  However, if the couple stayed in Vermont, the 
federal government would have to recognize the marriage as legally valid. 
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2003 was a watershed year for the gay rights movement.  First, the Supreme Court struck 
down all sodomy laws across the country in the case of Lawrence v. Texas, overruling a 1986 
decision (Bowers v. Hardwick) legitimizing these laws.  This Supreme Court decision legalized 
and decriminalized homosexual intimacy, protecting it as personal freedom and privacy.  Then, 
three months later, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court legalized gay marriage, giving 
same-sex couples in Massachusetts exactly the same rights as opposite-sex couples.  These two 
events set off a fire-storm across the country, with battles over the status of homosexuality and 
gay couples on the floor of the Senate, the ballot boxes of various states, and over the airwaves 
of the media (Chauncey 2004).  The decade following the watershed year of 2003 has witnessed 
several successes for the gay and lesbian community.  For instance, six states plus the District of 
Columbia have legalized gay marriage.  Several other states have allowed for civil unions and/or 
domestic partnerships, giving gay couples most of the same rights and benefits as straight 
couples.  Much like the rest of the history of the gay rights movement, successes have been met 
with setbacks over the past decade with 31 states adopting constitutional amendments that ban 
marriage between two members of the same sex, but the variation in the level of protection of 
gays and lesbians across the states is tremendous.  In some states, gays and lesbians enjoy greater 
protection under the law now than at any other point in history.
6
6
 See Gay Life and Culture: A World History by Robert Aldrich for a more precise timeline of the gay rights 
movement. 
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2.2 PUBLIC OPINION AND ATTITUDES TOWARD HOMOSEXUALITY AND GAY 
RIGHTS 
Early empirical studies of individual attitudes toward the gay community used public opinion 
polling data to assess the political tolerance of gays and lesbians in society and perceptions 
regarding the morality of homosexuality.  As such, a large body of literature exists in identifying 
predictors of homonegative attitudes.  The most commonly cited correlates to antigay attitudes 
include the belief that homosexuality is something a person can control (Haider-Markel and 
Joslyn 2008), not having contact with gay persons (Herek and Glunt 1993), gender (Herek 1988; 
Kite 1984), age (Herek 1988; Kite 1984), sexual conservatism (Ficarrotto 1990), 
authoritarianism (Greendlinger 1985), discrimination and prejudice toward other groups 
(Ficarrotto 1990), and religiosity (Johnson, Brems, and Alford-Keating 1997).  
While these are the most likely correlates of anti-gay attitudes, a general trend exists 
showing that, over time, American attitudes have become more favorable toward homosexuality 
and the gay population.  Indeed, data from the General Social Survey (GSS) shows that 
disapproval of homosexuality has moderated significantly over the past two decades: there has 
been a steady and dramatic drop in the number of Americans indicating that sex between two 
members of the same sex is always wrong, falling from 72% in 1973 to roughly 50% in 2008, a 
remarkable 22% decrease.  Further, this dramatic decline in disapproval has been coupled with 
greater numbers of Americans indicating an increased willingness to grant gays equal or similar 
rights on a number of issues (Wald and Calhoun-Brown 2007).  Many states have, in fact, 
enacted policies that protect individual rights for gays and lesbians.  Trends in public opinion 
toward both homosexuality and specific gay rights are outlined below. 
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2.2.1 Attitudes toward Homosexuality 
As the gay rights movement gained steam and gay rights issues became visible to the American 
public, public opinion regarding homosexuality and gay rights issues crystallized.  Much like 
attitudes about women’s liberation and race relations, Americans’ stance on rights for gay men 
and lesbians have, on average, grown more positive over the course of the last half-century 
(Yang 1999).  Figure 2.1 displays average responses to the feeling thermometer question 
included on the American National Election Study since 1984: “How would you rate (0-100) 
gays and lesbians, that is, homosexuals?”  The average feeling thermometer score for gays and 
lesbians has increased by 20 points, rising from 30 in 1984 to 52 in 2012.  Interestingly, the 
biggest jump occurred during the 1990s when federal government passed policies that were not 
gay friendly (Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell; Defense of Marriage Act), but when states began 
recognizing civil unions and the U.S. Supreme Court protected gay rights in Romer v. Evans.  In 
fact, as shown in Figure 2.2, the uptick in feeling thermometer ratings of the gay community 
represents the largest change of all groups queried in the ANES since 1988, including Jews, 
blacks, Hispanics, welfare recipients, and feminists.  While the uptick has been quite large in 
terms of gross positive change, gays are still rated lower than all other groups in the survey, even 
ranking below welfare recipients, though the gap is narrower now.  
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Figure 2.1: Average ANES Gay Feeling Thermometer Score, by Year 
Figure 2.2: Average Feeling Thermometer Group Scores, 1988-2008 
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Figure 2.3 displays more detailed information regarding the feeling thermometer for 
gays.  The number of people rating gays very coldly (0-10) has steadily declined since 1984, 
from 37% to only 12% in 2008.  Further, the number of people rating gays warmly, that is, above 
50, has steadily increased from only 12% in 1984 to 36% in 2008.  These changes represent 
positive changes in favorability of gays and lesbians of nearly 25 percentage points.  While the 
majority of respondents still rate gays coolly (50 and under), the modal category shifted from 
strong dislike (0-10 rating) to relatively neutral (41-50 rating) in 1996.  Additionally, roughly the 
same percent of respondents rate gays above and below this modal category, showing a 
decidedly more moderate feeling toward the group than in the recent past.  
Figure 2.3: History of ANES Gay Feeling Thermometer Responses, by Deciles 
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Figure 2.4 displays responses to the following question, first asked on the General Social 
Survey in 1973: “What about sexual relations between two adults of the same sex – do you think 
it is always wrong, almost always wrong, sometimes wrong, or not wrong at all?”7  As the figure
shows, the percentage of American indicating that homosexual conduct is always wrong 
decreased from 72% to 52% – a 20-point change.  Further, the percentage of Americans 
indicating homosexual conduct is not wrong at all increased from 10% to 38% – a 28 percent 
change.  These trends in approval of homosexual conduct indicate that while Americans still do 
not fully condone homosexual conduct, attitudes have been steadily moderating since at least 
1991.  
Figure 2.4: GSS Homosexual Conduct Responses, by Year 
7
 ‘Don’t know’ or ‘other’ was an option only in 1973 and 1974. 
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2.2.2 Attitudes toward Specific Gay Rights 
While early empirical studies focused on the morality of homosexuality, when the gay political 
movement began to mobilize in the 1970s, researchers began to focus on attitudes toward civil 
rights for gays and lesbians.  Regarding specific political issues, the clearest area of public 
support for lesbian and gay rights is on the issues of discrimination protection in employment 
and housing.  As early as 1978, polls reported two-to-one support for the view that homosexuals 
should be guaranteed equal treatment under the law in both jobs and housing.  Indeed, it is 
apparent that the most dramatic liberalization of American attitudes occurred in the area of these 
basic civil rights protections (Avery, Chase, Johansson, Litvak, Montero, and Wydra 2007).  
Figure 2.5 displays responses from the ANES’ question regarding discrimination protection for 
gays and lesbians.  At least 50% of Americans have supported laws protecting gays from 
discrimination since the question was first asked in 1988.  This number rose to 70% in the most 
recent version of available ANES data.  Figure 2.5 shows that the number of Americans who 
strongly favor laws to protect gays from discrimination more than doubled from 23% in 1988 to 
52% in 2008.  
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Figure 2.5: Support for Laws to Protect Homosexuals Against Discrimination 
Another policy area where Americans have been historically supportive of gay rights is 
on the issue of gays in the military.  Figure 2.6 displays responses to the question “Should gays 
be able to serve openly in the military?” meaning allowing “out” gay men and women to serve in 
the military.  Since 1992, when the question was first asked by the ANES, a majority of 
Americans have believed that gays should be allowed to openly serve in the military.  
Furthermore, the number of people feeling strongly that gays should be permitted to openly serve 
in the military has increased by 35%, from 30% to 65%.  In 2010, Congress passed a bill clearing 
the way to repeal the controversial “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy.  On September 20, 2011, it 
was officially repealed and the military began to accept openly gay citizens into its ranks.  Gay 
members of the military can no longer be punished for choosing to reveal their homosexuality.  
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Figure 2.6: Support for Gays Serving Openly in the Military 
The most controversial topics with respect to the gay community are issues revolving 
around family: gay marriage and gay adoption.  As Figure 2.7 shows, for much of the last two 
decades, a full two-thirds of Americans believed that marriage between same-sex couples was/is 
wrong and that homosexual couples should not have the same rights as heterosexual couples 
(Walen 1997; Newport 1999).  Over the past decade, however, support for civil unions and gay 
marriage has been on the upswing.  In a recent Gallup poll (May 2011), a majority of Americans 
– for the first time – indicated that gay marriage should be valid, with the same rights and
privileges as traditional marriage (Newport 2011).  Note that the biggest jumps are between 
1996-1999 (when Vermont recognized civil unions and the Supreme Court decided Romer) and 
2009-2001, when several states legalized gay marriage. 
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Figure 2.7: Support for the Validity of Same-sex Marriages 
Much less visible in the public debate over gay rights is the issue of adoption by gay 
individuals and couples.  Figure 2.8 displays responses to the ANES question regarding whether 
gays should be able to adopt children: “Do you think gay or lesbian couples, in other words, 
homosexual couples, should be legally permitted to adopt children?”  While the question has 
several drawbacks – it was first asked only in 1992 and is quite ambiguous – some trends can be 
seen.  The percentage of Americans who oppose adoption by gays has decreased by 20% over 
sixteen years, from 70% to 50%.  Further, the number of Americans who think gays should be 
able to adopt doubled in number from 25 to 50% in 2008.  In its last iteration, the number of 
Americans indicating that gays should be able to adopt became roughly equal to the number of 
Americans indicating that gays should not be able to adopt.  
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Figure 2.8: Support for Adoption by Same-sex Couples 
While gays have made great strides in public opinion on the issues of a number of basic 
civil rights, the public is still deeply divided on the more controversial issues surrounding the 
family.  But, in general, gays are seen in a far more positive light today than twenty or even ten 
years ago. 
2.2.3 Explanations for Change in Gay Rights Attitudes 
What has caused the liberalization of public opinion toward gays and gay rights issues?  A 
number of explanations have been set forth as the reason for the attitude change associated with 
gays and lesbians.  First, homosexuality was removed from the American Psychiatric 
Association’s (APA) Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-II, 7th
printing) in 1974.  The weight of empirical data derived from research being conducted at the 
time indicated that homosexuality was not a disease or a mental disorder.  These developments 
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led the APA’s Board of Directors’ to remove homosexuality as a mental disorder from the 
Manual (Bayer 1987).   
Second, more and more gay and lesbian Americans have been “coming out of the closet,” 
leading most Americans to realize that they know at least one person who identifies as gay or 
lesbian.  While the exact size of the gay population in America is hard to establish due to a 
number of reasons, the best estimates indicate that between 5 and 15% of the American 
population identifies as gay, lesbian, or transgendered (Sax 2010).  Studies have consistently 
shown that having personal contact with a gay or lesbian individual attenuates disapproval of the 
homosexual lifestyle (e.g., Herek and Glunt 1993; Herek and Capitanio 1999).   
Third, the media have changed their portrayal and treatment of gays.  News coverage of 
gays in the 1980s and into the 1990s was dominated by stories about AIDS and the Religious 
Right’s opposition to homosexuality.  Now, however, news coverage of the gay community has 
become more favorable, with the media focusing on concerns of the gay community (including 
bullying, which has figured heavily into media’s attention over the past year) and positive 
aspects of the gay rights movement.  Additionally, gay characters have been appearing on 
television with increased frequency over the past few decades.  In 1972, the first recurring gay 
character, Peter Panama, appeared on ABC’s sitcom The Corner Bar.  The first gay couple on 
television, known simply as George and Gordon, appeared on ABC’s Hot l Baltimore in 1975.  
The first sitcom centering around an openly-gay character was ABC’s Ellen and it ran for five 
seasons in the 1990s
8
 and featured lesbian comedienne Ellen DeGeneres, who later found 
success in daytime talk television.  Will & Grace, Queer as Folk, and Queer Eye for the Straight 
Guy were all popular television shows during the late-1990s, early-2000s and some of the most 
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 The “coming out” or “puppy episode” aired in the 4th season of the show’s run and created much controversy, 
prompting ABC to run a parental advisory warning before every episode.   
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popular current shows such as Modern Family and Glee prominently feature gay characters.  
Also, many real-life public figures have also “come out of the closet,” such as Barney Frank and 
Ken Mehlman (political figures), Elton John (musician), and Martina Navratilova (athlete).  This 
increase in the appearance of openly-gay characters and real-life gays and lesbians has given the 
American public more pseudo-contact with gays and lesbians and has contributed to increased 
favorable attitudes toward gays and lesbians.  
Additionally, three sociodemographic factors are linked to the increase in support for the 
gay community: education level, age, and religious tendencies.  First, the educational attainment 
of Americans has increased over the past twenty years (U.S. Census Bureau 2004).  Educational 
attainment has been consistently related to higher levels of tolerance of minority groups 
(Ohlander, Batalovab, and Treas 2005).  Those who are more educated also come in contact with 
more diverse populations, are exposed to more diverse ideas, and are generally more open to new 
experiences.  Second, older generations are being replaced by younger generations, who are 
more likely to support the homosexual lifestyle and extending rights to the gay community 
(Herek and Capitanio 1999).  Therefore, it is certainly possible that the increasing educational 
attainment and generational replacement of the American public are contributing to the more 
liberal attitudes regarding the morality of homosexuality.  Third, the religious makeup of the 
country is shifting dramatically.  The number of Americans who identify as secular has increased 
throughout the 1990s and 2000s (Hansen 2011).  This increase is most likely underestimated, 
because during the same time period, more and more religious identifiers were simultaneously 
noting that they were attending religious services less often than their counterparts in earlier 
decades (Harms 2009).  Since the most religiously devout are the most anti-gay (e.g., Olson, 
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Cadge, and Harrison 2006), the rise in secularism and decrease in religiosity has led to the 
moderation of negative attitudes regarding the gay community.   
Lastly, change in the public discourse about gay rights has been set forth as the cause of 
the liberal trajectory of public opinion.  Brewer (2008) argues that elite-level public debate over 
gay rights by policymakers, mass media, religious authorities, and interest group leaders steered 
public opinion on homosexuality and gay rights.  Brewer further argues that once public opinion 
shifted on gay rights, elites were forced to alter their message in order to comply more closely 
with what the public demanded.  In this way, the politics of gay rights simultaneously shaped 
public opinion and was shaped by public opinion.  
2.3 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, I have discussed the history of gay rights in the United States.  On a variety of 
issues and using a variety of measures, it is clear that support for homosexuals is on the rise and 
people are becoming more supportive of protections for gays and for gay rights.  That said, a 
significant number of people still are not supportive of gay rights and are even openly hostile to 
them.  Figure 2.2 is quite sobering, with people feeling “warmer” toward the poor, 
fundamentalists, welfare recipients, and even Congress than they feel toward gays.  Despite this, 
the trend is clear:  public opinion is shifting toward supporting more protections and more rights 
for homosexuals, especially among those under thirty. 
While there are many explanations for the shift in public opinion, the most interesting 
aspect, from a state politics standpoint, is whether institutions may have influenced this shift.  
Are institutions simply following public opinion or are state opinion leaders able to shape the 
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public opinion in their state on this issue?  The next chapter outlines my policy-driven theory of 
state institutional opinion leadership, and makes predictions about when and how institutions can 
influence the public opinion of state constituencies.  
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3.0 A POLICY-DRIVEN THEORY OF STATE INSTITUTIONAL OPINION 
LEADERSHIP 
On November 18, 2003, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts ruled 4-3 that the State of 
Massachusetts may not “deny the protections, benefits and obligations conferred by civil 
marriage to two individuals of the same sex who wish to marry.”9  This decision effectively
legalized gay marriage within the state.  At the time the decision was handed down, public 
opinion regarding the decision was mixed, with 50% of Massachusetts’ citizens in favor of the 
ruling and 38% opposed to it (Phillips and Klein 2003).   Regardless of the public’s mixed 
feelings, on May 17, 2004, 180 days after the ruling, Republican Gov. Mitt Romney ordered the 
state to begin issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples.  The first same-sex marriage license 
was granted that very same morning.  
In November of 2004 – the same year that same-sex marriages were first issued in 
Massachusetts – the citizens of Georgia voted overwhelmingly (76% of those voting) to amend 
the Georgia state constitution to restrict marriage to be between one man and one woman.  
Unsurprisingly, residents of Georgia at the time were squarely opposed to any recognition of 
same-sex relationships, with only 17% saying same-sex marriage should be legal and only 25% 
stating that gay couples should be allowed to form civil unions, but not marry (National Gay and 
Lesbian Task Force 2005).  The citizens of thirteen other states passed similar ballot initiatives 
9
 Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Massachusetts, 2003) 
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during the 2004 election cycle
10
 – a move often thought to be a backlash against the legalization 
of gay marriage in Massachusetts.   
On April 13, 2005, the Connecticut State House passed a bill granting civil unions to gay 
and lesbian couples and on April 20, the Connecticut State Senate passed the same bill.  
Governor Jodi Rell – a moderate Republican – signed the civil union bill into law the same day it 
passed the Senate and the first civil unions in Connecticut were issued on October 1, 2005.
11
  In a 
Quinnipiac poll released at this time, 56% of Connecticut residents supported civil unions, while 
37% opposed civil unions.  Additionally, Connecticut citizens opposed full gay marriage by a 
margin of 53-42.   
While all three of the cases detailed above are similar in that they involve state-level 
policy regarding gay citizens, they are also very different on a number of dimensions.  First, each 
of the three policies originated through different routes: the Massachusetts policy originated in 
the state court system, the Georgia policy originated with the people of Georgia, and the 
Connecticut policy originated in the state legislature.  Second, each of the policies are, on a 
continuum from pro-gay to anti-gay, of different directions and strengths: the Massachusetts 
policy is very pro-gay; the Connecticut policy is pro-gay; and the Georgia policy is anti-gay.  
Third, public opinion toward homosexuality is variable across the three states.  Citizens in 
Massachusetts and Connecticut are favorable toward gay rights issues, while citizens in Georgia 
generally hold unfavorable views on issues of gay rights.  These three factors (policy origination 
variability, policy variability, and public opinion variability) provide an excellent opportunity to 
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 The thirteen states are Arkansas, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, North 
Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, and Utah. 
11
 On October 1, 2010, all existing civil unions were automatically transformed into marriages following the 
Connecticut state supreme court’s 2008 ruling in Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health, (957 A.2d 407) 
holding that denying same-sex couples the full rights, responsibilities, and name of marriage violated the 
Connecticut state constitution’s equal protection clause.   
 38 
analyze the linkage between public policy and public opinion in the American states and the 
comparative capacity of state institutions to lead mass opinion, the focus of this dissertation. 
While the relationship between public opinion and public policy is interesting in and of 
itself, whether or not policy influences opinion or vice versa is only part of the story.  
Oftentimes, the most interesting aspect is not simply whether something happens, but rather 
when, why, and how it occurs.  That is, the most intriguing aspect of the connection between 
public opinion and public policy is identifying the times when policy is able to induce a change 
in the American public.  
Armed with the knowledge that elites in certain institutions are more or less favorable to 
their position and that certain institutions are in a better or worse position to influence public 
opinion in their interested policy area, policy specialists target the most beneficial institution of 
government to introduce their policy so as to obtain the optimal outcome for their policy 
(Baumgartner and Jones 1993).  While we know that policy shopping occurs across institutional 
venues, prior to adoption,  (Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Holyoke, Brown, and Henig 2012), we 
do not know the effect of those state institutions on the mass public.  Are all venues equally able 
to influence the public, or do certain institutions have a greater capacity to lead the mass 
opinions of state citizens?  My theory, detailed below, speaks to this question. 
3.1 A POLICY-DRIVEN THEORY OF ELITE OPINION LEADING 
The war over gay rights is primarily waged at the state level.  The prolonged debate over gay 
rights in the states during the 20
th
 and early 21
st
 centuries has resulted in dramatic policy changes
from state to state regarding protections for gays.  While the federal government has made only 
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eight policy decisions regarding the gay community
12
 – all in the late 20th and early 21st century 
– states have been debating gay rights for decades, often leading to dramatically different policy 
outcomes in different states.   
Until 2003, anti-sodomy laws existed and were occasionally enforced in several of the 
American states, meaning that homosexual couples were not guaranteed sexual privacy in all of 
the 50 states.  While these anti-sodomy laws were passed in order to criminalize homosexual 
conduct, the liberalization of sexuality in the 1960s led many states to reexamine and remove 
their anti-sodomy laws.  In 1962, Illinois because the first state to repeal its anti-sodomy law.  
Between 1962 and 2003, 36 states repealed or overturned their anti-sodomy laws.  With the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Lawrence v. Texas (2003), anti-sodomy laws in the 14 remaining 
states were repealed and, by extension, homosexual couples’ privacy rights became guaranteed 
by the Constitution.  Furthermore, Massachusetts became the first state to legalize same-sex 
marriage in 2003.   
In the years that followed, fourteen states and the District of Columbia joined 
Massachusetts in giving same-sex couples identical rights as heterosexual couples.
13
  Additional 
states – including Oregon and New Jersey – recognize civil unions or domestic partnerships for 
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 The first of these came in 1986 when the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a Georgia state law 
banning sodomy.  The second was in 1993 when the Clinton administration released a defense directive that ordered 
military applicants to not be asked about their sexual orientation.  This became well-known as “Don’t Ask, Don’t 
Tell.”  In 1996, the Defense of Marriage Act took effect, which states that gay marriages granted in one state need 
not be recognized in another.  The fourth also came in 1996 when the Supreme Court overturned an amendment to 
the Colorado state constitution that prevented any city or county in the state to include gays and lesbians as a 
protected class of citizens.  The fifth federal decision came in 2001 when the Supreme Court declared that 
consensual sex between two members of the same sex is a legal act in Lawrence v. Texas.  The sixth decision came 
in 2009 when President Obama signed the Matthew Sheppard Act into law, redefining hate crimes to include sexual 
orientation and gender identity.  The seventh decision by the federal government came in 2010 when the federal 
government repealed “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell.”  On June 26, 2013, the Supreme Court of the United States struck 
down the Defense of Marriage Act in Windsor v. US (2013), which gives same-sex couples the right to file federal 
taxes together and to receive benefits guaranteed by the federal government. 
13
 Connecticut legalized same-sex marriage in 2008, Iowa and Vermont did so in 2009, New Hampshire, and the 
District of Columbia legalized it in 2010, New York legalized same-sex marriage in 2011, Maryland, Maine and 
Washington did so in 2012, Minnesota, Delaware, Rhode Island, and New Jersey legalized same-sex marriage in 
2013, and, after a long court battle begun in 2008, California started grating same-sex marriages in 2013.   
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same-sex couples.  However, at the other end of the spectrum, voters in 30 states have approved 
ballot initiatives to amend state constitutions to ban same-sex marriage, and other states have 
statutory bans.  Additionally, while 33 states have recorded at least one policy protecting gay 
citizens from discrimination of some sort, 17 states currently have zero policies that protect their 
gay citizens from discrimination.   
It is clear that states are the relevant unit of analysis when studying gay rights, but most 
studies of the public opinion-public policy linkage use national-level data to draw conclusions 
about the nature of the relationship.
14
  For example, Brewer (2008) argues that elite-level public 
debate over gay rights steered public opinion on homosexuality and gay rights, testing his theory 
on the nation as a whole.  With results pointing in the other direction, Stimson, Mackuen, and 
Erikson (1995) find that “policy responds dynamically to public opinion change” (543) and that 
the degree of policy responsiveness varies by federal institution.  Neither study considers the role 
of state effects – a crucial omission.   
States are the frontier of the gay rights movement, and the political environments of the 
states vary widely.  This variation either facilitates or hampers the acquisition of valuable 
information for citizens.  Debates over the proposals, adoption, or enforcement of new policies 
alter the political environment in which citizens live.  By mere exposure to these policies, 
citizens become more inclined to support the policies and general ideologies espoused by their 
state government.  The aptly titled “mere exposure” effect in social psychology (Zajonc 1968) 
details and quantifies the extent to which individuals are influenced by repeated exposure to a 
given stimuli, even when they are not consciously aware of the stimuli’s existence (Monahan, 
Murphy, and Zajonc 2000; Bornstein, Leone and Galley 1987).  In study after study, scholars 
find that individuals express greater affect for the stimuli to which they have been repeatedly 
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 See chapter 2 for details.   
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exposed (Zajonc 1968; Bornstein and D’Agostino 1992; Monahan, Murphy, and Zajonc 2000; 
Whittlesea and Price 2001; Fang, Singh, and Ahluwalia 2007).   
In the context of the present study, policies resulting from the gay rights movement have 
caused direct exposure to and experience with a policy relating to a specific group of citizens – 
gays and lesbians.  This implies both a direct and indirect effect that can change attitudes toward 
homosexuality and gay rights.  The direct effect relates to repeated exposure to the policy itself.  
The indirect effect relates to states that adopt progressive gay rights legislation.  Once gay and 
lesbian citizens are protected by their state’s policies, they are more likely to “come out” and live 
their lives in an open and public manner.  This secondary effect of progressive policy is quite 
potent, as one of the leading causes of positive affect toward gays and lesbians, homosexuality, 
and gay rights policies is knowing at least one person who is gay or lesbian (Herek and Glunt 
1993).  Therefore, the mere exposure effect – both direct and indirect – helps to explain why 
there are clear differences in the attitudes of citizens in Massachusetts versus those in Mississippi 
toward both homosexuality and gay rights.   
While the mere existence of and exposure to policies can be enough to change attitudes, 
certain state-level characteristics such as polarization of state legislatures, cohesion of state 
judiciary, tone of the policy debate, ease of placing a policy issue on the ballot for a popular 
vote, and, especially, the institutional origination point have consequences for attitude change 
(Hoekstra 1995; Bartels and Mutz 2009).  Each of these environmental characteristics are both 
limited and influenced by organized interests including political parties.  The two major parties 
in the United States have staked out polar opposite positions on gay rights.  For as long as the 
Democratic Party has been associated with a liberal and progressive ideology, the Democrats 
have been associated with a more pro-gay agenda than Republicans.  For example, Harvey Milk, 
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a Democrat on the San Francisco Board of Supervisors, was the first openly gay politician in the 
United States and President Obama championed a package of policies meant to protect the rights 
of gay and lesbian American citizens (Marcus 2002).  As of 2012, the Democratic Party platform 
included language that is supportive of gay and lesbian citizens and families, noting that “gay 
rights are human rights” and thereby endorsing policies as wide-ranging as hate crime protection 
to hospital visitation to same-sex marriage (Democrats.org 2012).  The 2012 Republican Party 
platform, however, takes the reverse position by noting that, “the union of one man and one 
woman must be upheld as the national standard” (gop.com 2012). As such, partisanship tempers 
the extent to which political context influences attitudes.  If an individual’s partisanship is strong, 
then that individual should be less receptive to the environmental context.  
As detailed in the opening page of this chapter, gay rights policies are adopted via 
multiple origins.  However, most existing studies on the relationship between public policies and 
public opinion have treated all policy adoptions as one and the same (e.g, Lindaman and Haider-
Markel 2002; Lax and Phillips 2009) without differentiating between the multiple points of 
origin – state legislature, state judiciary, or direct democracy – and the ability of the policy from 
those institutions to lead public opinion.  This is an important oversight because one size does 
not fit all when describing the procedure through which gay rights policies come to existence.  
Within states, policy is the outcome of a long process that can be initiated in the state legislature, 
state court system, or the electorate itself through the ballot initiative process.  As detailed below, 
expectations regarding the policy-opinion relationship vary depending on the point of origin and 
lumping them all together in empirical analyses hinders the ability to draw conclusions reflective 
of the realities at play in state political environments. 
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3.1.1 State Legislature  
Constitutionally, the legislative branch is given the duty of crafting and adopting policy.  When 
policy comes from the legislature, the policy should closely match public opinion in the state.  
Since legislators must face voters at election time, legislators should be reticent to buck popular 
opinion regardless of their personal or political preferences.  Recognizing that legislators are 
single-minded seekers of reelection (Mayhew 1974), legislators must devote a significant amount 
of time courting public opinion so as to be reelected.  After all, if the legislator is not reelected, 
then the legislator is unable to pursue all other subservient goals such as good policymaking.  
Additionally, legislators are consistently rated below other members of government (Hibbing and 
Theiss-Morse 1995) and so they do not have much political capital to spend.  Instead, the theory 
goes that they must obey the public will.  That being said, Bartels and Mutz (2009) find that 
Congress can act as an opinion leader under some circumstances. 
Moreover, polarization and voter awareness are key factors to consider when a gay rights 
policy is initiated in a state legislature.  Per Zaller (1992), elites are capable of leading the 
opinion of moderately politically aware citizens when political elites are both unified and 
polarized.  If political elites are unified on the issue at hand, their unity removes partisan cues as 
an available heuristic for the moderately aware, and since the moderately aware presumably do 
not know who is behind the policy, the unified policy position can further sway public opinion.  
If, on the other hand, political elites are polarized, they are only able to move the moderately 
aware toward their partisan positions because the most aware are motivated to retain their own 
position and the least aware are ignorant of elite positions on any policy.  When political elites 
are polarized, they lead to polarization among the mass public.  If the state legislature adopts a 
liberal gay rights policy, then moderately aware citizens of that state are expected to become 
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more liberal toward gay rights and homosexuality in general.  Conversely, if the state legislature 
adopts a conservative gay rights policy, then moderately aware citizens of that state are expected 
to become more conservative toward gay rights and homosexuality in general.  If citizens are not 
knowledgeable, though, they will exhibit no detectable change in their own position on gay 
rights.  That is, the elite position has no bearing on the opinions of the least politically aware.   
If the legislative elites are not unified and therefore polarized, then their ability to move 
mass opinion toward their collective position (which is split, but with one side prevailing) is 
essentially zero.  Instead, due to the contentious public debate that results from fragmented elites, 
polarization occurs among both the most politically aware and the moderately aware.  The very 
public and very contentious public debate leads politically aware citizens to be motivated to 
become more steadfast in their position as a result of either validation of their position (if the 
legislature passed a congruent policy) or repudiation of their position (if the legislature passed a 
noncongruent policy).  Attitudinal polarization is the result.  
3.1.2 State Judiciary  
As traditionally understood, the policymaking process involves the legislature crafting policy and 
the executive signing the legislation into law.  This traditional conceptualization downplays the 
importance of the judicial branch in the policymaking process, with the judiciary only making an 
appearance in the process if constitutionality is in question.  However, there are many policy 
areas where the judiciary has played a large role in policymaking such as gay rights, education 
reform, and segregation (Rosenberg 2008).  In the case of gay adoption, of the thirteen states that 
have legalized adoption by gay couples, all but one state’s policy was initiated in the court 
system.   Multiple scholars argue that there is evidence that American policy is “distinctly court-
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centered” (Burke 2002, 171), and policy is often the outcome of litigation initiated by a 
representative of the public demanding action on a variety of social issues (Kagan 2001).  
Therefore, the relative insulation of the judicial branch provides an institutional venue that is not 
subject to the whims of the majority and can provide for large swaths of policy change for 
minority groups.   
A policy originating from the state judiciary should have slightly different effects than 
policy originating in the state legislature.  Courts are consistently rated as the most trusted 
institution of government (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 1995).  This trust gives them significantly 
more political capital when bucking public opinion.  Furthermore, the public often assumes that 
courts are insulated from political pressure and the whims of public opinion.  This is only 
partially true of the state level judiciary.  While all federal judges are appointed to life-long 
terms, the vast majority of state judges are not.  Instead, a variety of selection mechanisms are 
employed across the states in order to reach the state court of last resort, including partisan 
elections, nonpartisan elections, retention elections, and appointment processes.  Regardless of 
the method of selection, state judges are subjected to reappointment or reelection in all but three 
states (Bonneau and Hall 2009). 
If a policy is initiated in the judicial branch of state government rather than the legislative 
branch, a much different process occurs.  When policy comes from state courts, public debate 
over the issues under the court’s consideration has little influence on the decision making of the 
court.  Compared to debate over a policy from the legislature, there is relatively little debate in 
the public spotlight; the court goes about its decisionmaking behind closed doors, free from 
political ads and lobbyists.  Then, the court makes a ruling and the policy takes effect.  While 
there may be some public debate once the court decides to, or is forced to, hear a case, the public 
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debate, as compared to traditional policymaking, is truncated and leads to a differential impact 
on the public.  It is in this scenario that the public is most likely to follow elites due to two main 
reasons.  The first is that the state party elites have less time to frame the debate for their 
members.  With less direction from state-level party elites, the public must update on its own, 
often adjusting toward the institution’s position rather than toward their party’s position – 
especially if that institution is highly trusted by the public.  The second reason that a policy from 
the judiciary is most likely to lead to changes among the public toward the institution’s position 
is because the policy goes into effect either immediately or shortly after the decision is handed 
down.  This forces citizens to personally experience the effects of the policy rather than the fear 
of some unknown effect of that policy.  
Furthermore, evidence suggests that opinion regarding courts is steady, regardless of the 
composition of those serving on the court.  Caldeira and Gibson (1992, 658), in reference to the 
Supreme Court, state “the mass public does not seem to condition its basic loyalty toward the 
Court as an institution upon the satisfaction of demands for particular policies or ideological 
positions.”  Gibson, Caldeira, and Baird (1998) further find that high courts gain legitimacy and 
benefits from the public for decisions that the public finds pleasing but courts do not get 
penalized for unpopular or displeasing decisions, even highly controversial decisions such as 
Bush v. Gore (2000) (Gibson, Caldeira, and Spence 2003). 
Americans perceive judges to be politically neutral government officials tasked with 
interpreting the Constitution (Gibson 2012).  Therefore, when public policy originates in the 
court system, an interesting paradox arises within the public’s expectations.  On the one hand, 
citizens may be more likely to accept decisions arising from the courts since their decisions are 
perceived to arise from a reading of the American Constitution.  On the other hand, the public 
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expectation that courts are neutral in political matters may cause the public to discount the policy 
altogether.  This dismissal has two potential consequences: backlash or polarization.  First, 
backlash refers to public opinion actually moving in the opposite direction as the court-
established policy.  The public is unhappy with the court’s decision and therefore takes a 
competing position.  Second, polarization refers to public opinion splitting over the issue.  Some 
portion of the public moves with the court’s position but another portion moves against the 
court’s position, leading to a bimodal distribution of opinion on the issue.   Therefore, there are 
multiple potential public opinion outcomes based on popularly-held views on the role of the 
court in the political system. 
3.1.3 Direct Democracy 
The final route that gay rights policy can take is adoption by the electorate itself through direct 
democracy.  Direct democracy was first established in the United States in 1898 (Piott 1992).  
This democratic procedure allows citizens to directly influence policy without an intermediary 
such as the legislature or judiciary.  
Policy created via direct democracy requires clearing at least two steps before becoming 
law: proposal and ratification.  The specific processes for proposal (by institutions or citizens) 
and ratification (by citizens) look very different across the states.  States vary dramatically in 
their direct democracy provisions and the level of participation allowed to its citizens.  Issues 
decided through direct democracy have changed throughout American history, with social issues 
dominating during the New Deal era, civil liberties and civil rights during the 1950-60s, and tax 
and environmental issues in the 1970-80s.  Most recently, the issues of public morality, 
campaign finance, and criminal rights have gained prominence through direct democracy (Hahn 
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and Kamieniecki 1987; Bibby and Holbrook 1999; Cann and Wilhelm 2011).   
With regard to direct democracy, Cann and Wilhelm (2011) state that “the powers 
associated with citizen-oriented policy making are one side of the equation; citizen preferences 
and perceptions of policy need are the other” (1081).  They imply that citizens will be moved to 
use direct democracy either when they prefer policies or when they perceive a particular need for 
them, given legislative inaction or hostility.  Regardless of their reasons for placing a vote, it is 
important to note that direct democracy voters are not representative of the electorate or the 
nation as a whole: direct democracy voters tend to be more informed and more partisan than the 
American electorate due to the strong influence of interest groups and money in these ballot 
initiative contests (Dyck and Seabrook 2010).  
Some states allow for easy access to the ballot (e.g., California) while others make the 
process an uphill battle (e.g., Pennsylvania).  When policy comes from the ballot initiative 
process, the resultant policy should most closely resemble the desires of the people since the 
policy is influenced by the people at two separate points – first, when determining whether 
enough people find the issue worthy of reaching the ballot and, second, when voted on by people 
in the general election.  Furthermore, the mere presence of the ballot initiative option within a 
state can change the extent to which state elites follow the will of the people. In states where 
ballot initiatives and referendums are utilized, elites are under more pressure to ensure that 
policies of all types – including highly visible morality policies – closely match what the citizens 
want (Mooney and Lee 1995). If not, the legitimacy of state-level governmental institutions are 
at risk, since citizens can make an end-run around the legislative process by utilizing direct 
democracy.  Therefore, in states that employ ballot initiatives, elites should be less likely to buck 
popular (and often intolerant) opinion and popular opinion should reign supreme. 
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When policy comes from the legislature or a ballot referendum, there is significant debate 
leading up to the policy change itself.  This gives elites ample time to debate and polarize on the 
issue in a very public way that the masses are likely to notice.  This, in turn, leads to a polarizing 
effect on the masses.  Regardless of the ease of admission to the ballot initiative process, the key 
component is whether or not the debate surrounding the issue is polarized.  If not, then there is 
no detectable change among individuals because, absent any information from elites or the 
media, they will vote their own preferences.  If, however, the debate is polarized, citizens will 
become even more committed to their prior beliefs. 
3.2 HYPOTHESES  
In light of both the mere exposure theory and Bartels and Mutz’s (2009) research finding that 
both Congress and the Supreme Court can be mass opinion leaders, there is no reason to confine 
studies on institutional persuasion to the judiciary.  Below, I borrow from the judicial politics 
literature on courts and public opinion – specifically, the works of Persily, Egan, and Wallsten 
(2008) – to develop four potential outcomes regarding the ability of state institutions to lead 
public opinion; legitimation, backlash, polarization, and no effect. After discussing each 
potential outcome, I then hypothesize about the institutional circumstances under which I expect 
each one.   
 50 
3.2.1 Legitimation Hypothesis 
The first potential outcome is known in the judicial literature as the legitimation hypothesis: 
public opinion will align itself with the institutional position (Persily, Egan, and Wallsten 2008).  
That is, under certain circumstances, institutions can act as opinion leaders, influencing the 
public to move toward their institutional position.  This ability to move public opinion is referred 
to in the literature as legitimation.  
The legitimation hypothesis is based on the assumption that political institutions – 
typically courts – are held in relative high regard and so their pronouncements are given more 
weight and consideration by the public.  That is, if a state supreme court decision establishing 
policy is unanimous, it carries more weight and influences the political environment and the 
public much more than if the same decision were split 5-4 (Persily 2008).  Therefore, the level of 
unanimity in the originating institution and the public debate surrounding the policy affects the 
strength of the capability to move public opinion.  
Hypothesis 1.1: Public policy is more likely to cause legitimation when 
the tone of debate in the public sphere is cohesive and strongly in favor of 
the institutional policy position. 
Hypothesis 1.2: Public policy is more likely to cause legitimation when 
cohesion in the institutional venue of origin is high.  
Hypothesis 1.3: Legitimation is more likely to occur when policy 
originates in the state judiciary than when policy originates in the state 
legislature or via direct democracy.   
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3.2.2 Backlash Hypothesis 
The second potential public opinion outcome from policy is backlash: public opinion moves in 
the opposite direction as the policy (Persily, Egan, and Wallsten 2008).  That is, if the state 
legislature passes a bill that cuts education funding, public support for more spending on 
education actually increases.   
Since policy originating via direct democracy is technically from the public, backlash is 
unlikely to occur via this policy route.  However, backlash could occur when policy originates in 
either the state legislature or judiciary.  Backlash resulting from the legislature could occur 
because the public does not approve of the policy or because the public does not approve of the 
institution itself. Or, party leaders mobilize to oppose the policy and the public debate 
surrounding the issue becomes significantly more negative, causing the public to respond in 
kind.  Or, if the policy has very tangible effects that impact the lives of citizens and they 
disapprove of those newly created effects, they will respond unfavorably.   
Policy originating in the state judiciary can be seen as short-circuiting the legislative 
process of deliberative democracy since there is no possibility for appeal.  Charges of judicial 
activism are rooted in the concern that judges are supposed to be removed from traditional 
politics and not policymakers.   
Hypothesis 2.1: Public policy is more likely to cause backlash when the 
tone of debate in the public sphere is strongly opposed to the institutional 
policy position. 
 
Hypothesis 2.2: Backlash is more likely to occur when policy originates 
in the state legislature or state judiciary than when policy originates via 
direct democracy.   
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3.2.3 Polarization Hypothesis 
Polarization is the third potential consequence of policy on public opinion (Persily, Egan, and 
Wallsten 2008).  When polarization occurs, some portion of the public moves toward the 
institution’s position while another segment moves away from the institution’s position, usually 
along partisan lines.  The prime example of institutional leadership resulting in polarization is the 
case of abortion.  Immediately following the landmark Supreme Court decision of Roe v. Wade 
(1973), there was little change in public opinion on abortion (Franklin and Kosaki 1989).  
However, as visibility of the issue increased and as the political parties diverged on their 
positions, so too did the public.  In many ways, gay rights issues resemble abortion in that they 
both have become prominent features of the public agenda.  Therefore, it is conceivable that the 
outcome of institutional policy positions could be polarization. 
Hypothesis 3.1: Public policy is more likely to cause polarization in 
public opinion when the debate in the public sphere is non-cohesive 
(partisan).  
Hypothesis 3.2: Public policy is more likely to cause polarization in 
public opinion when the institutional position is non-cohesive (partisan).  
Hypothesis 3.3: Polarization is more likely to occur when policy 
originates in the state legislature or via direct democracy than when policy 
originates in the state judiciary. 
3.2.4 Null Hypothesis 
The fourth potential outcome of policy is that public opinion will not change at all in response to 
policy adoptions by states.  Instead, the null hypothesis suggests that mere exposure to policy is 
not enough to change mass opinion but rather in order for policy to have any influence on the 
public whatsoever, the public must be aware of that policy’s existence.  Since the bulk of issues 
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that political institutions undertake are either overly complex (such as those dealing with the tax 
code or contract) or below the radar (such as designating state holidays) of state publics, very 
few policy areas rise to the level of saliency and awareness necessary to move public opinion. 
Therefore, most of the policy decisions made by institutions go unnoticed as the public either 
does not have the ability to understand the policies made by institutions or is not aware of those 
policies.  Gay rights, however, is a visible and contentious policy area that can change attitudes 
through mere existence and exposure, exerting an influence over the public opinion of state 
citizens. 
Hypothesis 4.1: Since public policy originating from direct democracy 
theoretically comes from the public, it will have little effect on public 
opinion.   
3.3 CONCLUSION  
In this chapter, I set up my theory of contingent opinion leadership.  I argued that under some 
circumstances, state opinion leaders will be able to influence public opinion on gay rights.  
Specifically, legitimation occurs when policy originates from the judiciary and when the 
judiciary is relatively united in its position, both institutionally and in the public sphere.  
However, when policy originates from the state legislature, backlash is likely to occur.  This 
could be because of the relatively low levels of approval or because the policy itself is 
unpopular.  Finally, policy that originates from direct democracy (or the state legislature) could 
result in polarization, with one portion of the public moving toward the policy and another part 
moving away from it, due to partisan loyalties. 
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This theory argues that the impact of state institutions or opinion leaders on public 
opinion depends on (1) the institutional policy source, (2) the cohesiveness of the institution, and 
(3) the tone of the public debate surrounding the policy.  In Chapter 4, I lay out my research 
design that allows me to test my hypotheses. 
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4.0 RESEARCH DESIGN, DATA, AND VARIABLES 
Gay rights policies in the states have proliferated in recent years, with some states taking 
decidedly positive positions and other states taking distinctly negative positions. This chapter 
will document the variance across states in gay rights policies and public opinion and describe 
the research methods to be used to analyze the causal links between policies and opinions.  In the 
early 1970s, gay rights policies were virtually non-existent, but a slow and precipitous increase 
began in the late 1970s continuing through the 1980s and into the 1990s.  Since the mid-1990s, 
there has been an explosion in the total number of gay rights policies originating in the states.  At 
that time, a modest amount of gay rights policies were present in the states and the total number 
of policies dramatically increased through the next decade and a half.  Figure 4.1 displays this 
dramatic increase.  
Figure 4.1: Total Number of State-level Gay Rights Policies 
 56 
Figures 4.2-4.5 display maps of the United States with shading for the different gay rights 
policy profiles in the states for the years 2000, 2004, 2008, and 2012 – a particularly active time 
for gay rights policy adoptions.  Black shading indicates a state with a strongly traditional gay 
rights policy profile (5 policies) and white indicates a state with a strongly progressive gay rights 
policy profile (5 policies).  In Figure 4.2, the map of 2000, the United States appears to be a 
collection of 50 shades of gray: most states had one or two policies, but the absence of black and 
white indicates that the states had not yet polarized on gay rights. In Figure 4.3, which is the map 
of gay rights policies in 2004, the states begin to polarize, as a number of states moved in either 
more traditional or progressive directions, with some states shaded in white and others in black.  
For example, Massachusetts is absent of any shading, indicating that the state adopted every 
possible progressive gay rights policy.  Utah, on the other hand, is fully shaded in black, 
indicating that the state adopted every traditionally conservative gay rights policy.  This 
polarizing progression continues in 2008 (Figure 4.4) and 2012 (Figure 4.5).  Most of the 
movement occurred on the issue of marriage rights and protection for same-sex couples.  The 
2000 and 2004 general elections saw fifteen states’ voters ratify constitutional amendments with 
the clear purpose of forever-banning marriage between two persons of the same sex.
15
Conversely, between 2003 and 2013, many states’ political institutions have taken on the task of 
protecting gay individuals and families, with multiple states adopting marriage protections; 
thirteen states and the District of Columbia have legalized same-sex marriage as of July 2013. 
15
 These states are Arkansas, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, 
Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, and Utah. 
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Figure 4.2: State-level Gay Rights Policies in 2000 
Figure 4.3: State-level Gay Rights Policies in 2004 
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Figure 4.4: State-level Gay Rights Policies in 2008 
Figure 4.5: State-level Gay Rights Policies in 2012 
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4.1 GAY RIGHTS POLICIES AND PUBLIC OPINION ON HOMOSEXUALITY 
Table 4.1 outlines the history of policy adoptions in all fifty states and the District of Columbia 
with respect to five distinct gay rights policies: hate crime protection, discrimination protection, 
joint adoption by same-sex couples, civil unions, and same-sex marriage.  These five policies 
were selected because they are the five most relevant and researched gay-rights policies for both 
LGBT individuals and families.  Hate crime protections are those state-level policies allowing 
gay persons legal remedies if they are victims of hate crimes.  Each state with hate crime policy 
protections may define hate crimes as they wish, but the states appearing in the chart have 
specific language relating to gays and lesbians.  According to a report from the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation (FBI), there were 6216 single-bias hate crimes reported in the United States in 
2011.  Of those, 20.8% resulted from sexual orientation bias (Federal Bureau of Investigation 
2012).  The following example, provided by The Leadership Conference (2009), illustrates the 
impact of hate crime legislation: in May 2007, a gay man by the name of Sean Kennedy was 
fatally beaten in Greenville, South Carolina.  His attacker repeatedly shouted gay slurs while 
beating and forcing him to the ground, causing Mr. Kennedy’s head to knock against the 
sidewalk.  The assailant was initially charged with murder, but those charges were later reduced 
to involuntary manslaughter and the attacker spent only three years in prison.  No hate crime was 
charged since South Carolina does not have a penalty-enhancing hate crime law on the books.  
Contrast this situation with a similar crime committed in Colorado: In July 2008, a woman by the 
name of Angie Zapata was fatally beaten by her date after he found out she was transgendered.  
Her attacker was found guilty of first degree murder and a hate crime, and he was sentenced to 
life in prison without the possibility of parole (The Leadership Conference 2009).  Hate crime 
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provisions lead to harsher penalties for sexual orientation-based crimes in those states with 
relevant legislation.  
6
1
 
Table 4.1: Gay Rights Policies Adopted by Type 
Hate Crime 
Protection 
Discrimination 
Protection 
Joint Adoption by 
Same-Sex Couples 
Civil Unions Same-Sex Marriage 
PROGRESSIVE PROGRESSIVE PROGRESSIVE CONSERVATIVE PROGRESSIVE CONSERVATIVE PROGRESSIVE CONSERVATIVE
Alabama NO EXPLICIT BAN 2006 (B) 
1998 (L) 
2006 (B) 
Alaska NO EXPLICIT BAN 1996 (L) 
1996 (L) 
1998 (B) 
Arizona 1995 (L) NO EXPLICIT BAN 
1996 (L) 
2008 (B) 
Arkansas 2011 (C) 
2008-11 
(B) 
2004 (B) 
1997 (L) 
2004 (B) 
California 1984 (L) 1992 (L) 2003 (C) 2003 (L) 
May-Nov 
2008 (C) 
2000-08 
(L) 
2008 (B) 
Colorado 2005 (L) 2007 (L) 
NO EXPLICIT BAN 
and 2
nd
 parent adoptions
allowed 2007 (L) 
2000 (L) 
2006 (B) 
Connecticut 1987 (L) 1991 (L) 2001 (C) 2005 (L) 2008 (C) 
2000-07 
(L) 
Delaware 1995 (L) 2009 (L) 2001 (C) 2011 (L) 1996 (L) 
District of 
Columbia 
1989 (L) 1997 (L) 1995 (C) 2002  (L) 2009 (L) 
Florida 1991 (L) 
1977-2010 
(L) 
2008 (B) 
1977 (L) 
2008 (B) 
Georgia NO EXPLICIT BAN 
1996 (L) 
2004 (B) 
1996 (L) 
2004 (B) 
Hawaii 2001 (L) 1991 (L) 
2011 
(WRP) 
2011 (L) 
1994 (L) 
Idaho NO EXPLICIT BAN 
1996 (L) 
2006 (B) 
Illinois 1990 (L) 2005 (L) 1995 (C) 2011 (L) 1996 (L) 
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Table 4.1 (continued) 
Hate Crime 
Protection 
Discrimination 
Protection 
Joint Adoption by 
Same-Sex Couples 
Civil Unions Same-Sex Marriage 
PROGRESSIVE PROGRESSIVE PROGRESSIVE CONSERVATIVE PROGRESSIVE CONSERVATIVE PROGRESSIVE CONSERVATIVE
Indiana 2003 (C) 1997 (L) 
Iowa 1990 (L) 2007 (L) 
2009 
(WRP) 
2009 (C) 
1998-2008 
(L) 
Kansas 2002 (L) NO EXPLICIT BAN 2005 (B) 
1996 (L) 
2005 (B) 
Kentucky 1998 (L) 
NO EXPLICIT BAN but 
2
nd
 parent adoptions
prohibited – 2008 (C) 
2004 (B) 
1998 (L) 
2004 (B) 
Louisiana 1997 (L) NO EXPLICIT BAN 
1988 (L) 
2004 (B) 
1988 (L) 
2004 (B) 
Maine 1987 (L) 2005 (L) 2007 (C) 
May-Nov 
2009 (L) 
2012 (B) 
1997 (L) 
2009-2011 
(B) 
Maryland 1991 (L) 2001 (L) 
2013 
(WRP) 
2012 (L,B) 
1973-2011 
(L) 
Massachusetts 1996 (L) 1989 (L) 1993 (C) 2003 (C) 
Michigan 
2004 (E – 
attorney 
gen) 
2004 (B) 
1996 (L) 
2004 (B) 
Minnesota 1988 (L) 1993 (L) NO EXPLICIT BAN 1997 (L) 
Mississippi 2000 (L) 
1997 (L) 
2004 (B) 
Missouri 2000 (L) NO EXPLICIT BAN 
1996-98, 
2001 (L) 
2004 (B) 
Montana NO EXPLICIT BAN 1997 (L) 
1997 (L) 
2004 (B) 
Nebraska 1997 (L) 2002 (C) 2000 (B) 2000 (B) 
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Table 4.1 (continued) 
Hate Crime 
Protection 
Discrimination 
Protection 
Joint Adoption by 
Same-Sex Couples 
Civil Unions Same-Sex Marriage 
PROGRESSIVE PROGRESSIVE PROGRESSIVE CONSERVATIVE PROGRESSIVE CONSERVATIVE PROGRESSIVE CONSERVATIVE
Nevada 1989 (L) 1999 (L) 
2009 
(WRP) 
2009 (L) 2002 (B) 
New Hampshire 1990 (L) 1997 (L) 1999 (L) 
1987-1998 
(C) 
2007 (L) 2009 (L) 
1987-2008 
(L) 
New Jersey 1990 (L) 1992 (L) 1995 (C) 2006 (C) 
New Mexico 2003 (L) 2003 (L) NO EXPLICIT BAN 
New York 2000 (L) 2002 (L) 1995 (C) 2011 (L) 
North Carolina NO EXPLICIT BAN 
1995 (L) 
2012 (B) 
North Dakota 
NO EXPLICIT BAN but 
2003 (L) law allows 
agencies to discriminate 
for moral reasons 
2004 (B) 
1997 (L) 
2004 (B) 
Ohio 1998 (C) 
2004 (L) 
2004 (B) 
2004 (L) 
2004 (B) 
Oklahoma NO EXPLICIT BAN 
1975 (L) 
2004 (B) 
Oregon 1989 (L) 2007 (L) 
2008 
(WRP) 
2007 (L) 
1975 (L) 
2004 (B) 
Pennsylvania 2002-08 (L) 
NO EXPLICIT BAN  
but 2
nd
 parent adoptions
are routinely granted 
2002 (C) 
1996 (L) 
Rhode Island 1991 (L) 1995 (L) 
2011 
(WRP) but
adoptions were 
routinely 
granted by 
family courts 
2011 (L) 
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 Table 4.1 (continued) 
Hate Crime 
Protection 
Discrimination 
Protection 
Joint Adoption by 
Same-Sex Couples 
Civil Unions Same-Sex Marriage 
PROGRESSIVE PROGRESSIVE PROGRESSIVE CONSERVATIVE PROGRESSIVE CONSERVATIVE PROGRESSIVE CONSERVATIVE
South Carolina NO EXPLICIT BAN 2006 (B) 
1996 (L) 
2006 (B) 
South Dakota NO EXPLICIT BAN 2006 (B) 
1996 (L) 
2006 (B) 
Tennessee 2001 (L) NO EXPLICIT BAN 
1996 (L) 
2006 (B) 
Texas 1991 (L) NO EXPLICIT BAN 
2003 (L) 
2005 (B) 
1997 (L) 
2005 (B) 
Utah 2000 (L) 
2004 (L) 
2004 (B) 
1977 (L) 
2004 (B) 
Vermont 1990 (L) 1992 (L) 1993 (C) 1999 (C) 2009 (L) 
2000-08 
(L) 
Virginia NO EXPLICIT BAN 
2004 (L) 
2006 (B) 
1997 (L) 
2006 (B) 
Washington 1993 (L) 2006 (L) 
2009 
(WRP) 
2009 (L) 2012 (L,B) 
1998-2011 
(L) 
West Virginia NO EXPLICIT BAN 2000 (L) 
Wisconsin 1988 (L) 1982 (L) 1994 (C) 2006 (B) 
1979 (L) 
2006 (B) 
Wyoming NO EXPLICIT BAN 1977 (L) 
NOTES: 
(L) indicates that the policy originated in the state legislature, (J) indicates that the policy originated in the state judiciary, (B) indicates that the policy originated 
through direct democracy, and (WRP) indicates that the policy was adopted when relationship protection became binding on the states.   
Adoption policy is noted only when explicit authorization exists such that both partners in a same-sex relationship may petition to adopt a child. 
Civil unions are noted when the policy grants same-sex couples the same benefits and legal protections as opposite-sex couples, except where noted. 
Sources: Human Rights Campaign (2013), National Gay and Lesbian Task Force (2013), and Francis, Mialon, and Peng (2012). 
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Discrimination protections are those state-level policies allowing gay persons legal 
remedies if they have been discriminated against at work or in housing.  Massachusetts was the 
second state to adopt comprehensive discrimination protection for gays and lesbians, a policy 
that is routinely enforced.  For example, from 1997-99 a gay male corrections officer by the 
name of Michael Salvi faced persistent rumors and slurs regarding his sexual orientation.  
Further, he received undesirable work assignments and unsatisfactory organizational remedies 
for his concerns.  After filing suit in court, a jury awarded Mr. Salvi $623,600 plus interest and 
attorney’s fees as the result of the harassment and discrimination he faced (Labor Relations 
Information System 2013).  In states that do not include sexual orientation in their discrimination 
protection legislation, citizens in Mr. Salvi’s position have no legal remedy against their 
employer.  
The final three policies all speak to familial issues.  Joint-adoptions by gay families are 
those policies allowing gay couples the right to adopt a child.  Civil unions are legal relationships 
for gay persons that are similar to marriage.  I have included in Table 4.1 only those states with 
near-exact rights as marriage for gay couples rather than very limited unions, typically referred 
to as domestic partnerships.  Same-sex marriage is exactly as it sounds: equal marriage laws for 
same-sex and opposite-sex couples.  These family-centered policies are the most high profile 
frontier in the gay rights movement. 
Table 4.1 presents the years when policies were adopted, whether those policies were 
progressive or traditional, and the source of the policy adoption (either state judiciary, state 
legislature, or ballot initiative).  The table shows that all hate crime and discrimination protection 
laws originated in state legislatures.  Further, the table shows that the earliest laws protecting 
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same-sex families (through adoption and/or civil union/marriage) originated with state courts,
16
but the most recent legal protections for same-sex families originated with the state legislatures 
(as was the case in New York’s legalization of same-sex marriage in 2011) and/or the voters (as 
was the case in the legalization of same-sex marriage in both Maryland and Washington in 
2012). Maryland was the first state to adopt a restrictive policy with respect to the gay 
community in 1973 when the Maryland legislature passed legislation defining marriage as 
existing between one man and one woman.  Wisconsin was the first state to adopt an inclusive 
gay rights policy in 1982 when its legislature passed a policy including sexual orientation as a 
protected category with regard to discrimination.  Some surprising situations arise, such as the 
fact that two of the most traditional states in the union with respect to gay rights are Michigan 
and Ohio, states which typically are more liberal in terms of their elected officials.
17
As the table and maps make clear, gays and lesbians enjoy greater protection under the 
law now than at any other point in history.  But states differ greatly in terms of their policy 
positions toward gay rights.  Some states, such as many of those in the southeastern United 
States, have taken a broadly traditional approach (not recognizing gay rights and even passing 
laws prohibiting recognition of gay rights) while other states, such as those in the northeastern 
United States, have taken a generally progressive approach (recognizing and protecting gay 
rights).  For instance, Massachusetts has enacted a broad range of gay rights policies, including 
protections guaranteeing same-sex families the exact same protections as opposite-sex families.  
16
 While the traditional role of the judiciary within the separation of powers framework is the interpreter of state 
laws and the state constitution, judicial actors – particularly those serving on state courts of last resort – have been 
known to “make” law, such as when the Massachusetts state supreme court interpreted the Massachusetts state 
constitution as protecting all couples – same-sex and opposite-sex – thereby “creating” same-sex marriage in the 
state.    
17
 In the history of the gay rights legislation, state executives have served in a more complementary way by signing 
into law (or vetoing) the specific legislation adopted in the state legislatures. 
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Mississippi, however, has enacted a traditional gay rights policy profile, strictly defining 
marriage and family as existing between opposite-sex individuals.  
Table 4.2 shows the average score on the homosexuality attitude scale broken down by 
state.  Numbers in the cells represent average state-level response scores from 1973-2008 to the 
following question from the General Social Survey: “What about sexual relations between two 
adults of the same sex – do you think it is always wrong, almost always wrong, wrong only 
sometimes, or not wrong at all?”  The variable ranges from 1-4 with 1 indicating sexual relations 
between two members of the same sex are always wrong and 4 indicating that sexual relations 
between two members of the same sex are not wrong at all.  The table displays the states from 
least supportive of homosexuality to most supportive.  As is obvious, there is not one single 
mean across all states; rather, there is wide variation across the states.  For example, Alabama 
has the lowest average rating of homosexuality with an average citizen score of 1.22, while 
Maine has the highest average rating of homosexuality with an average citizen score of 2.77.  
The difference between the averages of the two states is nearly two points on the 4-point 
homosexuality attitude scale – a huge difference.  
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Table 4.2: Average Homosexuality Attitude Score By State 
State 
Average 
Homosexuality 
Score 
Alabama 1.22 
Kentucky 1.27 
Arkansas 1.29 
Utah 1.30 
West Virginia 1.38 
Mississippi 1.40 
Tennessee 1.41 
North Carolina 1.48 
Oklahoma 1.55 
Georgia 1.56 
Montana 1.57 
Missouri 1.60 
Indiana 1.60 
South Carolina 1.61 
Louisiana 1.62 
Texas 1.62 
Delaware 1.73 
North Dakota 1.76 
Michigan 1.81 
Florida 1.82 
Pennsylvania 1.83 
South Dakota 1.85 
Virginia 1.85 
Wyoming 1.87 
Wisconsin 1.87 
Iowa 1.93 
Kansas 1.99 
Oregon 2.03 
Illinois 2.03 
Rhode Island 2.04 
New Hampshire 2.05 
Minnesota 2.06 
Maryland 2.12 
Connecticut 2.15 
New Jersey 2.15 
Arizona 2.16 
Colorado 2.17 
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Table 4.2 (continued) 
State 
Average 
Homosexuality 
Score 
New York 2.19 
Washington 2.19 
California 2.21 
Alaska 2.24 
Idaho 2.26 
New Mexico 2.27 
Massachusetts 2.37 
Vermont 2.65 
Hawaii 2.69 
Maine 2.77 
NOTE: Numbers in the cells represent average state-level response scores from 1973-2008 to the following question 
from the General Social Survey: “What about sexual relations between two adults of the same sex – do you think it 
is always wrong, almost always wrong, wrong only sometimes, or not wrong at all?”  The variable ranges from 1-4 
with 1 indicating sexual relations between two members of the same sex are always wrong, 2 indicating that sexual 
relations are almost always wrong, 3 indicating sexual relations are wrong only sometimes, and 4 indicating that 
sexual relations between two members of the same sex are not wrong at all.   
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Does the fact that certain states have adopted progressive policy positions while other 
states have adopted traditional policy positions on gay rights have any impact on the public 
opinion of citizens within the various states?  It could be the case that all the influence on 
attitudes may come from federal policies or Supreme Court rulings (Stoutenborough, Haider-
Markel, and Allen 2006; Hoekstra and Segal 1996).  Or, public opinion may influence policy 
adoption in the states, but not vice-versa (Lax and Phillips 2009).  Alternatively, if all politics is 
truly local, constituent opinions may be led by their local representatives.  Unfortunately, the 
political science literature does not provide much guidance on the final alternative. 
Furthermore, state institutions have taken varied approaches to gay rights.  In general, 
state courts have been more inclined to act to protect rights for gay individuals and families 
while state legislatures have been less inclined to act in favor of gay rights.  Because the court 
system typically does not rely on majority rule, unlike state legislators who are always selected 
in plurality elections, courts tend to serve as bastions of hope for minority rights.  Does the fact 
that certain institutions have been more inclined to adopt gay rights policies have any influence 
on public opinion?  The literature on the United States Supreme Court suggests that the Supreme 
Court can and does act as an opinion leader (Baas and Thomas 1984; Hoekstra and Segal 1996).  
Regarding the United States Congress, only one study currently exists that explores a 
relationship between legislative policy and opinion, and the authors conclude that Congress can 
act as an opinion leader under certain circumstances (Bartels and Mutz 2009).  Unfortunately, no 
studies exist exploring the opinion leadership capabilities of state courts or legislatures.  Due to 
the uncertain nature about state institutions’ impact on public opinion through established 
scholarly research and the fact that state institutions vary so widely from state-to-state – in terms 
of professionalism, docket size, agenda scope, ease of access to direct democracy processes, 
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political culture, to name a few –the exact nature and direction of the relationship is not clear, 
though there are good reasons to suspect that state institutions can and do serve as opinion 
leaders (see Chapter 3).  
This dissertation explores the comparative ability of state institutions – state judiciaries, 
state legislatures, and interest groups through direct democracy – to lead mass public opinion 
through the adoption of public policy.  I seek to explain if, when, and how state institutions serve 
as opinion leaders for their state citizenry.  In order to do this, I use state-level data over time. 
4.2 RESEARCH DESIGN 
I evaluate the hypotheses detailed at the end of Chapter 3 in three empirical stages.  First, I test 
whether state institutions are able to move public opinion with the adoption of public policy by 
running fixed effects models.  Second, I run a mixed, multilevel model to determine when and 
how state institutions and their policies lead to changes in individual attitudes and public 
opinion.  Third, I verify my findings about the impact of state institutions with two robustness 
checks. 
4.2.1 Stage 1: Are State Institutions Capable of Leading Opinion? 
The first step in exploring the comparative capacity of state institutions is to establish whether 
institutional opinion leadership is even possible in the first place.  In order to determine this, I 
run a fixed effects model.  Fixed effects regression exploits within-state variation over time in 
order to control for all time-invariant factors (e.g., political culture, race, gender), thereby 
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holding constant (fixing) the average effects of each state.  In essence, a fixed effects model 
includes dummy variables for each state in the dataset, controlling for any time invariant factors 
that could account for changes in individual homosexuality attitudes.  Utilizing a fixed effects 
model as the first cut to explore the policy-opinion relationship is ideal because it isolates the 
effect of public policy on attitudes by controlling for any variation within the state-year, causing 
unobserved variables to drop out of the model.  These characteristics of fixed effects models 
make them the bluntest form of hypothesis testing because the control variables are so 
encompassing. 
4.2.2 Stage 2: When and How Can State Institutions Lead Opinion? 
After establishing whether state institutions are able to move public opinion, the next step in my 
dissertation is to determine when and how institutional opinion leadership occurs in the various 
states with real political institutions, policies, and citizens.  In order to do this, I use mixed, 
multilevel models, which allow me to model the natural nested nature of the data.  Individuals 
are nested within states and those states have specific characteristics that are relevant only to 
their citizens.  Through citizens’ mere exposure to them, these state-specific characteristics 
influence the attitudes of citizens. Mixed models recognize this variation attributed to the state-
level and model the two sources of variation to individual homosexuality attitudes: within cluster 
random effects and between cluster fixed effects.  Multilevel models, then, are variance 
component models that allow me to describe any data point as a deviation from the overall 
intercept and slope as well as the intercept and slope associated with the states.  Observations 
between states are independent, but observations within each state are dependent because they 
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belong to the same subpopulation and are influenced by the same state characteristics.  This 
means that I can gain some control over heterogeneity.  
4.2.3 Stage 3: Are My Findings Robust? 
In chapter one, I detailed the relationship between public opinion and public policy and the 
controversy that exists over the true directionality of that relationship.  Since a potential 
reciprocal relationship is present between my primary variables of interest – public policy and 
public opinion – and a potential endogeneity problem arises from the link between policy and 
opinion, I perform two robustness checks as the final empirical portion of my dissertation.  The 
first check on robustness is an exploration of the reverse relationship: switching the dependent 
and key independent variables in order to test the impact of lagged opinion on policy with both 
fixed effects and mixed models, as detailed above.  
The second check on robustness controls for the problem of endogeneity.   
Methodologically, endogeneity problems occur because of association between an independent 
variable and the error term associated with the econometric equation.  Given the plausible 
scenario that there is correlation between the error term and my key independent variable, public 
policy at t-1, since there are significant concerns of reverse causality, the use of an additional 
methodology to further examine the exact nature of the relationship among and between the 
variables and the error term becomes necessary.  As such, I run my models with two-stage least 
squares (2SLS).  
2SLS is a two-step regression model that uses instrumental variables – variables 
correlated with my potential endogenous variable, lagged policy, but not correlated with the 
dependent variable, homosexuality attitudes – to correct for the endogeneity problem detailed 
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above.  As the name suggests, 2SLS proceeds in two stages: (1) the assumed endogenous 
variable, lagged policy, is regressed on all of the exogenous variables in the model, and then (2) 
the regression of policy’s impact on opinion is estimated, except that the endogenous covariate is 
replaced with the predicted values from the first stage.  The logic behind 2SLS is that since the 
computed values in stage one are uncorrelated with the errors, the results of the two-stage model 
are optimal. 
4.3 DATA 
I have chosen to use data from the General Social Survey (GSS) over the American National 
Election Survey (ANES) – the most common data source for political scientists researching 
public opinion – for a number of reasons.  First, the GSS data samples from every state, unlike 
the ANES time series data, which omits several states due to their small and hard-to-reach 
populations.  Second, the GSS has consistently included a question regarding the gay community 
since 1973 – eleven years before the ANES first asked about attitudes toward homosexuality or 
the gay community.  Third, the GSS sample is consistently large, with as many as 1908 
respondents answering questions relating to the gay community in 2006 and as few as 868 
respondents answering in 2004.  The fact that the GSS has consistently asked questions 
regarding the gay community to such large numbers of citizens bodes well for drawing 
conclusions about homosexuality attitudes.  
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4.3.1 Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable in the GSS time series data analysis is respondents’ approval of sexual 
relations between two members of the same sex.  The variable is created from responses to the 
question “What about sexual relations between two adults of the same sex – do you think it is 
always wrong, almost always wrong, wrong only sometimes, or not wrong at all?”  The variable 
ranges from 1-4 with 1 indicating sexual relations between two members of the same sex are 
always wrong, 2 indicating that sexual relations are almost always wrong, 3 indicating sexual 
relations are wrong only sometimes, and 4 indicating that sexual relations between two members 
of the same sex are not wrong at all.  
4.3.2 Independent Variables 
Policy is the revealed preference of a political institution and measuring the direction and 
intensity of said policy is key to understanding institutional opinion leadership.  Policy cannot 
influence opinion instantaneously, however, due to the delay between passage, adoption, and 
implementation.  Therefore, my key variable of interest is the lagged number of gay rights 
policies.  The lagged policy variables were created by coding each of the five policy types (gay 
marriage, civil unions, gay adoption, discrimination protection, and hate crime protection) as 1 
(for a progressive gay rights policy position), 0 (for no policy), or -1 (for a traditional gay rights 
policy position), and then summing across state-years.  Once summed, the policies were lagged 
by one year.  The lagged total policy variable ranges from -5 (for states with 5 traditional gay 
rights policies) to 5 (for states with 5 progressive policies), and the institutional policy variables 
range from -2 to 2 for policy originating in state legislatures, -1 to 3 for policy originating in 
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state courts, and -2 to 0 for policy originating via direct democracy procedures in the states.  In 
some of the model specifications, the variable is coded as total number of policies and, in other 
models, the variable is coded as the number of policies per year originating in the specific state 
institutions (i.e., number of policies originating in the state legislature, state courts, or direct 
democracy).  Some states have negative values because they have adopted anti-gay policies, 
most often a constitutional amendment defining marriage as between one man and one woman 
and restricting adoptions to married couples.  
The tone of public debate is a key element to consider when explaining opinion on 
homosexuality attitudes.  Public debate is led by political elites.  Therefore, I include a variable 
derived from Berry, Ringquist, Fording, and Hansson’s (BRFH hereafter, 1998) state elite 
ideology scores.  The BRFH scores are constructed through the ideological placement of 
members of Congress by two interest groups – Americans for Democratic Action and the AFL-
CIO Committee on Political Engagement.  Then, the scores for each state’s congressional 
delegation are averaged together to create the overall elite ideology score for each state.  This 
process places every state’s elites on the same conservative-liberal continuum.  I used these 
scores to create a measure of the difference between the percentage of conservative and liberal 
legislators in the states, with small numbers meaning high polarization and large numbers 
indicating cohesion. 
In the political science literature, the BRFH variable was the first attempt at trying to 
locate political elites from disparate states on the same continuum.  The BRFH measure relies on 
ideological placements of members of Congress by two interest groups – Americans for 
Democratic Action and the AFL-CIO Committee on Political Engagement.  The measure, 
therefore, assumes that the average ideological position of state officials matches the average 
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ideological position of House members from the same state.  Because there is no guarantee that 
congressional legislators’ ideology maps directly onto state legislators’, the BRFH measure is 
not perfect for exploring state politics.  However, it is the best measure available for my dataset 
and has been shown to be comparable to a more comprehensive state legislative delegation 
measure (Berry, Fording, Ringquist, Hanson, and Klarner 2013).  These state legislative 
delegation measures, collected by Shor and McCarty (2011), only include data from the mid 
1990s onward.  Therefore, the BRFH measure captures my whole time period while keeping all 
state elites on the same metric, allowing for meaningful comparisons across states.   
I include a series of variables that take into account whether consensus existed in the 
political body when the policies were adopted.  A policy adopted by a unified body sends a 
stronger message to constituencies than a divided one and can perhaps lead to more institutional 
opinion leadership.  Therefore, I include three variables in my models to account for whether the 
policy came about as a result consensual or divided politics in the various policy origination 
points – state courts, state legislatures, and direct democracy.  
I include a measure of cohesion on the state courts of last resort.  The measure is derived 
from the Party-Adjusted Judge Ideology (PAJID) scores developed by Brace, Langer, and Hall 
(2000).  PAJID scores combine (1) the partisan affiliation of judges in each of the 50 states with 
(2) the prevailing ideology of their state at the time the judge came to the bench with (3) a 
measure of mass or elite ideology (mass ideology is used if the judge is selected via election and 
elite ideology is used if the judge is selected via appointment).  PAJID scores are currently the 
most reliable and accurate measure of judicial ideology used in the judicial politics literature 
(Brace, Langer, and Hall 2000).  PAJID scores range from 0-100 with 0 indicating the most 
conservative ideology and 100 indicating the most liberal ideology.  I then used these scores to 
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create a measure of the level of partisan cohesion on the state bench by differencing the PAJID 
score of the most liberal and the most conservative state supreme court justices, with large 
numbers indicating wide spread in ideology/non-cohesion and small numbers indicating 
cohesion. 
In order to measure legislative cohesion, I include a measure of the difference between 
the percentage of Democratic and the percentage of Republican legislators in the various state 
legislatures, with small numbers meaning polarization and large numbers indicating low 
polarization/cohesion.  This measure is derived from Carl Klarner’s Partisan Balance Dataset 
(2013).  Klarner compiled information about state legislatures from 1937 through the present 
day, including the total number of representatives serving in state legislatures from each political 
party.  Klarner’s dataset is the most wide-ranging dataset currently available on state legislatures. 
The Democratic and Republican Parties have taken dramatically different stances on gay 
rights issues, as detailed in the last chapter.  Therefore, perhaps it is not the partisan spread in the 
state legislature that influences public opinion through policy, but rather which party is in control 
of the policy docket.  Therefore, I also include a dummy variable of partisan control of the state 
legislature for each year. 
For policies that originate with direct democracy, the relevant measure of cohesion deals 
with the citizens themselves.  Therefore, I include a measure of state citizen ideology also 
created by BRFH.  Their measure relies on actual election returns from states in order to place 
active electorates on the same continuum across the various states.  The variable ranges from 0-
100 with 0 indicating a fully conservative citizenry and 100 indicating a fully liberal citizenry.  
Across the period under study, Idaho has the most conservative citizenry (25.00 average 
ideology score) and Massachusetts is the most liberal citizenry (81.86 average ideology score). 
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State citizens do not live in a vacuum. Through the wide availability of national news on 
television and the internet, people living in one state are aware of, and potentially influenced by, 
the gay rights policies from other states and the federal government.  In an effort to control for 
anything occurring at the federal-level – specifically, the potential for federal institutional 
opinion leadership – I have included a variable that controls for the national trend in 
homosexuality attitudes.  The variable is computed as the average response of all GSS 
respondents within each year.  Figure 4.6 presents a graphical represent of this national trend.  I 
expect a positive relationship between the national trend and individual homosexuality 
attitudes.
18
Figure 4.6: National Trend of Homosexuality Attitudes 
As discussed in Chapter 2, attitudes have warmed toward gays and lesbians since the 
1990s and must, therefore, be controlled for in any empirical model explaining homosexuality 
18
 I considered using state deviations from the national trend as the federal-level control.  However, a number of 
state-years have a very small number of people.  Therefore, the state deviation independent variable is very highly 
correlated with the dependent variable.  Aggregating across all states within a given year alleviates this problem.  
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attitudes.  Therefore, I have also included a year count in the model to account for possible 
influences on homosexuality attitudes occurring within any given year.  The year count included 
in my models is unique in that it does not begin with 0 in 1973 (the first year of GSS 
questioning) and switch to 1 for 1974.  Rather, the year count is 0 from 1973-1986 and switches 
to 1 in 1987, 2 in 1988, and so on.  I made this methodological decision due to the fact that the 
rapid proliferation of gay rights policies did not commence in the states until 1987.  It was only 
after 1987 that policies – both more and less restrictive of the gay community – began to rapidly 
appear, as is evident in Figure 4.1.  I augmented the coding scheme in order to more accurately 
reflect this reality.  I have included state*year count variables in the model to account for a basic 
time trend across the states.  
Age is measured as the year in which the respondent was born.  The average age of 
respondents in the GSS is 45.5.  In order to facilitate interpretation, respondents’ ages are 
centered around the mean age of the sample.  Given that homosexuality has only recently 
become an acceptable lifestyle, younger people are more likely to have contact with “out” 
members of the gay community.  It is known that contact with gay people produces more 
permissive attitudes (e.g., Kite 1984; Herek and Capitanio 1999), thus I expect that those 
members of the sample below the average age are more likely to be supportive of the gay 
community and report greater warmth toward them. 
Further, the data are rather mixed between men and women.  45.7% of the GSS sample 
are men and 54.3% are women.  Multiple studies have shown that women are, on average, more 
supportive of the gay community than men (e.g., Herek and Capitanio 1999; Kite 1984).  I 
expect the same findings. 
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Educational attainment is measured by a seven-point scale gauging the highest 
grade/level of education completed, with a 0 indicating completion of eight grades or fewer and a 
6 indicating an advanced degree completion.  In order to facilitate interpretation, respondent 
education level is centered around the mean education level of the sample, which was 
completing high school, but not obtaining a college degree.  Since higher levels of education are 
associated with more tolerant attitudes toward all outgroups (e.g., Ohlander, Batalovab, and 
Treas 2005), I expect the same finding. 
Race has proven to be a highly controversial topic in the debate over gay rights.  The 
blogosphere and some segments of the media blamed the approval of Proposition 8 in California 
on the large numbers of African Americans who turned out to vote for Barack Obama (Hill 
2008).  Since blacks were blamed by the public at-large for the passage of Prop 8, a dummy 
variable for African American is included in the models, with whites as the reference category.  
In line with past research, I expect that African Americans are less tolerant of the gay 
community. 
Negative attitudes toward the gay community and gay rights have historically been linked 
to a conservative ideology (Ficarrotto 1990; Herek and Capitanio 1999).  Further, because the 
Republican Party embodies largely conservative values, Republicans are more likely to hold 
negative attitudes toward the gay community.  Party identification is measured by a 7-point 
scale, coded 0 for Strong Democrat and 6 for Strong Republican.  48.6% of the sample is 
Democratic, 35.1% is Republican, and 14.8% is Independent.  
Religious commitment has often been linked to attitudes toward the gay community 
(Green 2000; Olson, Cadge, and Harrison 2006).  Religiosity is measured by frequency of 
attendance at religious services.  It is a scale from 0 (never attend) to 4 (weekly attendance).  
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While this measure taps only one dimension of religiosity, it should not be a significant 
drawback, as service attendance is considered to be the key measure of religiosity (Olson, Cadge, 
and Harrison 2006).  Taking into account all of the respondents in the GSS dataset from 1973-
2008, 15.4% of the sample reports never attending church, while 8.5% report attending services 
at least once a week and 56.1% are somewhere between the two extremes.  I expect that high 
levels of religiosity serve to decrease positive attitudes toward the gay community. 
The religion and politics literature indicates that religious tradition is an important 
predictor of political attitudes, including political tolerance (Kellstedt and Green 1993; Layman 
and Green 1998).  The literature explicates six major religious traditions in the United States: 
Evangelical Protestants, Mainline Protestants, black Protestants, Roman Catholics, Jews, and 
seculars but the GSS data only include information about four main religious traditions: 
Catholics, Jews, Protestants, and seculars.  Therefore, I include dummy variables for Catholic, 
Jewish, and secular in the models to follow, leaving out Protestants as the reference category.  
The Catholic Church has been vocally opposed to homosexuality,
19
 while Jews and seculars have
been vocally supportive.  I expect Catholics to be less supportive of the gay community, while 
Jews and seculars to be more supportive of the gay community than Protestants. 
For convenience, Table 4.3 lists and describes all of the variables in the models to be 
tested in this dissertation. 
19
 Evangelical Protestants have also been vocal opponents of homosexuality, but the GSS does not include adequate 
questions in every year to properly measure evangelicalism of respondents.  
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Table 4.3: Variable Descriptions 
Variable Variable Description 
Dependent 
Variable 
Homosexuality 
Attitude =1 for sexual relations between two members of the same sex are always wrong 
2 for sexual relations between two members of the same sex are almost always 
   wrong 
3 for sexual relations between two members of the same sex are wrong only 
   sometimes 
4 for sexual relations between two members of the same sex are not wrong at all 
Independent Variables 
Total Policy t-1 =total number of gay rights policies in states at t-1 
varies by state and year 
negative numbers indicate traditional policies 
positive numbers indicate progressive policies 
ranges from -5 to 5 
Legislative Policy 
t-1 =number of gay rights policies originated in state legislatures at t-1 
varies by state and year 
negative numbers indicate traditional policies 
positive numbers indicate progressive policies 
ranges from -2 to 2 
Court Policy t-1 =number of gay rights policies originated in state courts at t-1 
varies by state and year 
negative numbers indicate traditional policies 
positive numbers indicate progressive policies 
ranges from -1 to 3 
Direct Democracy 
Policy t-1 =number of gay rights policies originated via direct democracy at t-1 
varies by state and year 
negative numbers indicate traditional policies 
positive numbers indicate progressive policies 
ranges from -2 to 0 
Elite Ideology =Berry, Ringquist, Fording, and Hanson’s elite ideology scores 
0 for fully liberal citizenry 
100 for fully conservative citizenry 
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Table 4.3 (continued) 
Variable Variable Description 
Elite Ideology =Berry, Ringquist, Fording, and Hanson’s elite ideology scores 
0 for fully liberal citizenry 
100 for fully conservative citizenry 
Legislative 
Cohesion 
=
Absolute value of the difference between the percentage of Democratic 
and Republican legislators 
Small numbers indicate  polarization 
Large numbers indicate cohesion 
ranges from 0-1 
Partisan Control of 
the State 
=
0 if Democratic 
Legislature 1 if Republican 
Court Cohesion 
=
Absolute value of the difference between the PAJID ideology scores of the 
most liberal (0 minimum) and the most conservative  (100 maximum) state 
supreme court justices in each state 
Small numbers indicate cohesion 
Large numbers indicate polarization 
Citizen Ideology =Berry, Ringquist, Fording, and Hanson's state-level citizen ideology scores 
0 for fully liberal citizenry 
100 for fully conservative citizenry 
National 
Homosexuality 
Attitude Trend 
=Average support for homosexuality (1-4) each year 
Year Count =0 for 1973-86 
1 for 1987 
2 for 1988 
… 
Age =Age of respondent centered around mean of 45.5 years old 
Female =1 if female 
0 otherwise 
Education =
Education of respondent centered around mean of 12.7 years of schooling 
(some college) 
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Table 4.3 (continued) 
Variable Variable Description 
African American =1 if African American 
0 otherwise 
Party ID =0 for strong Democrat 
1 for not strong Democrat 
2 for Independent, near Democrat 
3 for Independent 
4 for Independent, near Republican 
5 for not strong Republican 
6 for strong Republican 
Church Attendance =0 for never attend church 
1 for less than once a year 
2 for once a year 
3 for several times a year 
4 for once a month 
5 for 2-3 times per month 
6 for nearly every week 
7 for every week 
8 for more than once a week 
Secular =1 if secular 
0 otherwise 
Jewish =1 if Jewish 
0 otherwise 
Catholic =1 if Catholic 
0 otherwise 
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4.4 CONCLUSION 
The aim of this dissertation is to evaluate the comparative ability of state institutions – state 
judiciaries, state legislatures, and interest groups through direct democracy – to lead mass public 
opinion through the adoption of public policy.  This chapter laid out my plan to address this 
puzzle, and described the measures to be used.  The next chapter tests my hypotheses by using 
the data, methods, and variables described here by answering the following questions: 
(1) Are state institutions capable of acting as opinion leaders? 
(2) When and how can state institutions lead mass public opinion? 
(3) Does the impact of policy on opinion hold up to rigorous robustness checks? 
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5.0 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF PUBLIC POLICY AND PUBLIC OPINION 
This dissertation explores the comparative ability of state institutions – state judiciaries and state 
legislatures – to lead mass public opinion through the adoption of public policy.  This chapter 
evaluates empirically whether and how state institutions are able to act as opinion leaders, 
moving state-level public opinion.  Using data stretching back to 1973, this chapter will address 
two main questions: (1) can policy lead public opinion in the various states? and (2) to what 
extent are there significant differences in the persuasive ability of state courts and state 
legislatures, and direct democracy?  
5.1 REVIEW OF HYPOTHESES 
In order to answer these questions, the following hypotheses will be tested in this chapter: 
5.1.1 Legitimation Hypothesis 
Hypothesis 1.1: Public policy is more likely to cause legitimation in public 
opinion when the debate in the public sphere is cohesive and one-sided. 
Hypothesis 1.2: Public policy is more likely to cause legitimation in public 
opinion when cohesion in the political body where the policy originated is high. 
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Hypothesis 1.3: Legitimation is more likely to occur among public opinion when 
the policy originates from the state judiciary than when the policy originates in 
the state legislature or direct democracy.   
5.1.2 Backlash Hypothesis 
Hypothesis 2.1: Public policy is more likely to cause backlash in public opinion 
when the public debate surrounding the issue is strongly opposed to the 
institutional policy position.   
Hypothesis 2.2: Backlash is more likely to occur among public opinion when the 
policy originates from the state legislature than when the policy originates in the 
state judiciary. 
5.1.3 Polarization Hypothesis 
Hypothesis 3.1: Public policy is more likely to cause polarization in public 
opinion when the debate in the public sphere is non-cohesive (partisan).  
Hypothesis 3.2: Public policy is more likely to cause polarization in public 
opinion when the institutional position is non-cohesive (partisan).  
Hypothesis 3.3: Public opinion is more likely to be polarized when policy 
originates in the state legislature or through direct democracy than when policy 
originates in the state judiciary. 
5.1.4 Null Hypothesis 
Hypothesis 4.1: Since public policy originating from direct democracy 
theoretically comes from the public, it will have no effect on public opinion.   
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5.2 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF PUBLIC POLICY AND PUBLIC OPINION 
As is the case with many policy areas ranging from lotteries to education policy to public health 
policy, states have served as the laboratories to test gay rights policies as well as the site of the 
battles waged over the gay rights movement.  Have states, through policy adoption, been able to 
influence residents’ public opinion on homosexuality in one direction or another?  To examine 
the relationship between attitudes toward homosexuality and state-level policy, I first run a fixed 
effects model of lagged policy’s impact on individual homosexuality attitudes.  As noted in 
Chapter 4, fixed effects models serve as the strictest test of my hypotheses since the fixed effects 
models control for all time-invariant factors and average state effects, isolating policy’s effect on 
opinion.  As a result, if my key independent variable, lagged policy, is significant in a fixed 
effects model, it indicates that policy has an impact on individual attitudes over and above 
anything specific to the individual states, years, or state-year events.  
The fixed effects empirical model is as follows: 
To briefly recap from chapter 4, the dependent variable, homosexuality attitude, is 
measured as the yearly state-level average of GSS respondents’ approval of sexual relations 
between two members of the same sex on a scale from 1-4 with 1 indicating sexual relations 
between two members of the same sex is always wrong and 4 indicating that sexual relations 
between two members of the same sex is not wrong at all. 
My key independent variable, lagged state policy, is measured as the number of gay 
rights policies per year in each state at time t-1.  In some of the model specifications that follow, 
the variable is coded as total number of policies and, in other models, the variable is coded as the 
Yit homosexuality attitude = β0 + β1state policyt-1 + β2year count + β3state*year count +αi+uit
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number of policies per year originating in the specific state institutions.  The total policy variable 
ranges from -5 (for states with 5 traditional gay rights policies) to 5 (for states with 5 progressive 
policies), and the institutional policy variables range from -2 to 2 for policy originating in state 
legislatures, -1 to 3 for policy originating in state courts, and -2 to 0 for policy originating via 
direct democracy procedures in the states.  Interestingly, in the years examined here, no pro-gay 
policies came from direct democracy measures.  
I have also included a year count in the model to account for possible influences on 
homosexuality attitudes (such as federal policies or media coverage) occurring within any given 
year.  The year count included in my models is unique in that it does not begin with 0 in 1973 
(the first year of GSS questioning) and switch to 1 for 1974.  Rather, the year count is 0 from 
1973-1986 and switches to 1 in 1987, 2 in 1988, and so on.  This methodological decision 
reflects the fact that the rapid proliferation of gay rights policies did not commence in the states 
until 1987.  It was only after 1987 that policies – both more and less restrictive of the gay 
community – began to appear rapidly, as is evident in Figure 4.1.  I augmented the coding 
scheme in order to more accurately reflect this reality.  I have included state*year count variables 
in the model to account for a basic time trend across the states in order to control for anything 
occurring within each state-year that might account for changes in individual homosexuality 
attitudes.  Lastly, αi is the unknown intercept for each respondent and uit is the error term.  
Table 5.1 reports the results from the fixed effects model described above with two 
different specifications.  The first specification, found in Model 1, estimates the impact of the 
total number of state policies on individual homosexuality attitudes.  The model itself is 
significant, as indicated by the strength of the F statistic.  The within state variation explained by 
the inclusion of the total policy variable and time trends is 4.5%, the between state variance 
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explained by the model is 1.4%, and the overall variation explained by the policy variables and 
time trends is 3.3%.  Additionally, the rho statistic for the model indicates that 37.7% of the 
observed variance is due to differences across states.  The intercept for the model is 1.592, 
implying that the average attitude toward homosexuality across respondents is somewhere 
between 1 and 2 on the GSS scale, indicating that homosexuality is always wrong or almost 
always wrong.  The only variable besides the state*year dummies that reaches statistical 
significance is the year counter, indicating that the time trend associated with homosexuality 
attitudes is negative.  In this model, total policy is not a significant predictor of individual 
homosexuality attitudes. 
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Table 5.1: Fixed Effects Model of Lagged Policy Impact on Individual Homosexuality Attitudes 
(1) (2) 
Total Policy t-1 
0.041 
(0.029) 
- 
Policy from State 
Legislatures t-1 
- 
0.060+ 
(0.032) 
Policy from State 
Courts t-1 
- 
0.061 
(0.106) 
Policy from Direct 
Democracy t-1 
- 
-0.035 
(0.040) 
Year Count 
-0.181*** 
(0.014) 
-0.191*** 
(0.030) 
Constant 
1.592*** 
(0.001) 
1.596*** 
(0.005) 
Observations 30176 30176 
Groups 48 48 
Min Obs per Group 37 37 
Avg Obs per Group 628.7 628.7 
Max Obs per Group 2938 2938 
Corr (u_i, Xb) -0.396 -0.422 
Within R
2
 0.045 0.045 
Between R
2
 0.014 0.011 
Overall R
2
 0.033 0.031 
sigma_u 0.916 0.945 
sigma_e 1.176 1.176 
rho 0.377 0.392 
Model also includes 47 constants, consisting of state*year in order to account for any time trends occurring in the 
individual states.  Full results are available in the Appendix found at the end of this dissertation. 
For comparison purposes, Maine is the omitted state. 
No observations in Nebraska or Nevada. 
Standard errors are clustered by state and reported in parentheses 
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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The second specification, found in Model 2 of the table, estimates the impact of the 
number of state policies originating in various points in government on individual homosexuality 
attitudes.  The within state variation explained by the inclusion of the policy variables and time 
trends is 4.5%, the between state variance is 1.1%, and the overall variation explained by just the 
policy variables and time trends is 3.1%.  Further, the rho statistic in the model indicates that 
39.2% of the observed variance is due to differences across states.  The intercept is 1.596, 
implying that the average attitude toward homosexuality across respondents is somewhere 
between stating that homosexuality is always wrong or almost always wrong.  Looking at the 
institutional venue policy variables, only policy originating in the state legislatures reaches 
marginal statistical significance at the 0.10 level.  The coefficient of lagged legislative policy is 
0.06, meaning that a 1-unit change in number of policies originated in the state legislature results 
in a 0.06 change in homosexuality attitude.  The lagged legislative policy variable ranges from -2 
to 2, meaning that a state with two progressive policies for gays originated in the state legislature 
results in a 0.18 increase of support for homosexuality and a state with two traditionally 
conservative gay rights policies results in a 0.18 decrease of support for homosexuality.  
Therefore, the difference of living in a state with 2 traditional gay rights policies and a state with 
2 progressive gay rights policies is a difference of 0.36, or almost a half point on the 
homosexuality support scale.  However, policies originating in state courts or direct democracy 
seem to have no discernible impact on homosexuality attitudes.  In these models, the impact of 
policy originating in the state judiciary or through direct democracy cannot be distinguished 
from zero. 
While the fixed effects models above are a good first test of the influence of policy on 
opinion – and policy originating in the state legislatures has some predictive power – they do not 
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tell the whole story.  The battle for gay rights primarily occurs at the state level – not the federal 
level – and, therefore, the methodological exploration of the phenomenon should mirror reality 
as closely as possible.  As such, I have chosen to conceptualize homosexuality attitudes as a 
multilevel model in which individuals are nested within states that have direct impact on those 
individuals’ attitudes.  Each of the following models includes a variety of state characteristics 
designed to capture the unique state environments that exist across the country. 
Studying the relationship between homosexuality attitudes and state policy in the context 
of a multilevel model is beneficial for a number of reasons.  First, the multilevel model allows 
me to account for the nested nature of the data (individuals are nested within states) and therefore 
predict levels of attitudes toward gays based on both fixed (factors that are the same for 
individuals across states) and random (factors that vary across states) parameters through a 
maximum likelihood process.  In this way, multilevel models are variance component models 
that allow me to describe any data point as a deviation from the overall intercept and slope as 
well as the intercept and slope associated with the states.   This allows me to gain some control 
over heterogeneity.  Allowing for random variation in the dependent variable – residual factors 
that cannot be explained by the independent variables in the model – makes each case truly 
unique from others in the dataset. 
 Second, the inclusion of time in my models – as both an independent variable and a 
random parameter – allows me to control for the general trend witnessed over the past twenty 
years or so of warming feelings toward homosexuality and gay individuals.  Including time as an 
independent variable allows me to control for the trend in the overall sample; including time as a 
random component allows me to control for state-specific trends, giving me the ability to isolate 
relevant state- and individual-level characteristics.  The multilevel empirical model to be 
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explored is as follows: 
The dependent variable, state policy variables, and year count included in this model are 
the same as in the fixed effects models presented earlier.  A number of state characteristics are 
also included in these mulilevel models, including elite ideology scores as a proxy for public 
political debate (Hypotheses 1.1, 2.1, and 3.1), the numerical difference between the most liberal 
and most conservative judge on the state court of last resort as a proxy for court cohesion, as well 
as (1) the numerical difference between the total percentage of Republicans and Democrats in the 
state legislature and (2) a dummy variable indicating partisan control of the state legislature as 
proxies for legislative/elite cohesion (Hypotheses 1.2 and 3.2), and citizen ideology scores as a 
proxy for cohesion in the citizenry (when policy originates via direct democracy).  As discussed 
in Chapter 4, the national trend of mean homosexuality attitudes is also included in the models 
for the purpose of accounting for the inevitable relationship between national politics and 
state/local politics.  Many of the multilevel models to be explored also include individual 
characteristics as control variables, including age, education, sex, a dummy variable for African 
American, party identification, church attendance, and a series of religion dummy variables.  
Lastly,  is the random portion of the state-level intercept,  is the random portion of the 
state-level slope for time, and  is the idiosyncratic error term for a given state at a given time.  
Looking at Models 1 and 2 in Table 5.2, which use state-level characteristics to estimate 
the influence of (1) total gay rights policies and (2) institutional policy sources on homosexuality 
attitudes, the models are both statistically significant, as indicated by the significance of the χ2 
Yithomosexuality attitude = β00 + β01state policyt-1 + β02year count + 
β03state characteristics + β04individual characteristics + ζ0i + ζ1i + εit
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terms.   Turning to the fixed parameters first, the coefficient on the constant is the homosexuality 
attitude value when all independent variables are at 0.  Therefore, -0.309 (in Model 1) and -0.287 
(in Model 2) are the attitude scores for a respondent living in a state with zero progressive gay 
rights policies, a strongly conservative elite body, an ideologically moderate state court of last 
resort, an equal number of Democrats and Republicans in a state legislature controlled by 
Democrats, a strongly conservative citizenry, and when the average national response to 
homosexuality is a 0 – homosexuality is always wrong – in the year 1973.  The coefficient is 
statistically insignificant and therefore indistinguishable from 0. The year counter is 
insignificant as well, but the time-dependent national average homosexuality attitude is highly 
significant.  This means that time itself is not a predictor of individual attitudes but the national 
trend does have some explanatory power over individual evaluations of homosexuality. The 
coefficient on the variable in the first two model specifications, is 1.026 and 1.022, meaning that 
a one-unit increase in the national homosexuality attitude (from sexual relations between two 
members of the same sex is always wrong (1) to sexual relations between two members of the 
same sex is almost always wrong (2)) is associated with a slightly higher than one-unit increase 
in individual attitudes.  Models 1 and 2 are devoid of individual characteristics and so in the 
absence of information about individual respondents, the national average is a strong and 
positive predictor of individual attitudes.   
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Table 5.2: Multilevel Models of State- and Individual-level Characteristics’ Impact on Homosexuality Attitudes 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Fixed Parameters 
Total Policy t-1 
0.161** 
(0.057) 
0.051 
(0.093) 
0.128** 
(0.045) 
0.049 
(0.074) 
Legislative Policy t-1 - 
0.116+ 
(0.061) 
- 
0.081 
(0.051) 
Court Policy t-1 - 
0.149* 
(0.068) 
- 
0.082 
(0.056) 
Direct Democracy Policy 
t-1 
- 
0.005 
(0.045) 
- 
-0.022 
(0.037) 
Elite Ideology 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
Elite Ideology * Total 
Policy 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001* 
(0.000) 
0.001+ 
(0.000) 
0.001* 
(0.000) 
Court Cohesion 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
Court Cohesion * Total 
Policy 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
Legislative Cohesion 
0.034 
(0.059) 
0.033 
(0.063) 
0.075 
(0.048) 
0.068 
(0.050) 
Legislative Cohesion * 
Total Policy 
-0.077 
(0.047) 
-0.094* 
(0.047) 
0.010 
(0.039) 
-0.003 
(0.037) 
Republican Control of 
Legislature 
0.012 
(0.036) 
0.016 
(0.036) 
0.006 
(0.027) 
0.008 
(0.028) 
Republican Control * 
Total Policy 
-0.016 
(0.031) 
-0.009 
(0.033) 
-0.008 
(0.023) 
0.001 
(0.024) 
Citizen Ideology 
0.004** 
(0.002) 
0.004* 
(0.002) 
0.004*** 
(0.001) 
0.003** 
(0.001) 
Citizen Ideology * Total 
Policy 
-0.003** 
(0.001) 
-0.003** 
(0.001) 
-0.002** 
(0.001) 
-0.002* 
(0.001) 
National Homosexuality 
Attitude Trend 
1.026*** 
(0.184) 
1.022*** 
(0.183) 
0.879*** 
(0.142) 
0.884*** 
(0.140) 
Year Count 
0.000 
(0.007) 
0.051 
(0.093) 
0.005 
(0.005) 
-0.006 
(0.005) 
Age (centered around the 
mean for the sample) 
- - 
-0.007*** 
(0.001) 
-0.007*** 
(0.001) 
Female - - 
0.189*** 
(0.014) 
0.189*** 
(0.014) 
Education (centered 
around the mean for the 
sample) 
- - 
0.082*** 
(0.005) 
0.082*** 
(0.005) 
African American - - 
-0.187*** 
(0.024) 
-0.187*** 
(0.024) 
Party ID - - 
-0.058*** 
(0.005) 
-0.057*** 
(0.005) 
Church Attendance - - 
-0.090*** 
(0.004) 
-0.090*** 
(0.004) 
Secular - - 
0.499*** 
(0.028) 
0.498*** 
(0.028) 
Jewish - - 
0.766*** 
(0.054) 
0.767*** 
(0.054) 
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Table 5.2 (continued) 
Catholic - - 
0.133*** 
(0.020) 
0.133*** 
(0.020) 
Constant 
-0.309 
(0.322) 
-0.287 
(0.321) 
0.419+ 
(0.250) 
0.427+ 
(0.245) 
Random Parameters 
sd (slope) 
0.015 
(0.003) 
0.014 
(0.004) 
0.010 
(0.003) 
0.010 
(0.003) 
sd (intercept) 
0.191 
(0.028) 
0.193 
(0.027) 
0.109 
(0.022) 
0.108 
(0.020) 
sd (residual) 
1.174 
(0.027) 
1.174 
(0.027) 
1.068 
(0.021) 
1.068 
(0.021) 
Observations 30176 30176 29158 29158 
Groups 48 48 48 48 
Min Obs per Group 37 37 36 36 
Avg Obs per Group 628.7 628.7 607.5 607.5 
Max Obs per Group 2938 2938 2815 2815 
Wald χ2 (13, 16, 22, 25) 312.61 377.06 6510.99 7272.89 
Prob > Wald χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Log Pseudolikelihood -47761.95 -47759.48 -43365.84 -43364.04 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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With respect to the state characteristic variables in the models below, their interpretations 
are not straightforward due to the fact that my state characteristic hypotheses are conditional.  
This conditionality means that I only expect to find a policy effect on opinion under certain state-
level circumstances: legitimation when public debate is cohesive and/or institutional cohesion is 
high, backlash when public debate is partisan, polarization when public debate and/or 
institutional cohesion is partisan.  In order to ascertain whether or not the conditional relationship 
is statistically significant, the independent effect of the interaction terms must be calculated and I 
have created a number of graphs to facilitate the interpretation of state characteristic effects on 
the policy-opinion relationship (Friedrich 1982; Brambor, Clark, and Golder 2006).  It is 
important to note that while the coefficients on the interaction may not reach statistical 
significance in Table 5.2, the interaction itself may still be significant since “the typical results 
table often conveys very little information of interest because the analyst is not concerned with 
model parameters per se; he or she is primarily interested in the marginal effect of X [policy] on 
Y [opinion] for substantively meaningful values of the conditioning variable Z [state 
characteristics]” (Brambor et al. 2006, 74).  
Figures 5.1-5.5 display the marginal effects for each of the state characteristic interaction 
terms in Model 1 of Table 5.2.  Figure 5.1 shows the marginal effects of the elite ideology 
interaction term with total gay rights policies.  All values of elite ideology are statistically 
significant, which, when looking at the graphs, means that as progressive policies are added, 
public opinion becomes more tolerant of homosexuality regardless of elite ideology levels.  This 
means that, regardless of conservative or liberal elite ideology, policy is influencing opinion by 
an average of two points on the homosexuality attitude scale.  
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Figure 5.1: Marginal Effects of the Elite Ideology Interaction Term, Total Policy Model with State Characteristics 
Figures 5.2-5.5 present the marginal effects for the institutional cohesion variables.  
Figure 5.2 shows the marginal effects for the court cohesion interaction term.  All values of court 
cohesion are statistically significant, which means that additional progressive policies cause 
public opinion on homosexuality to liberalize by an average of 1.5 points on the homosexuality 
attitude score scale regardless of the level of cohesion on the court.  
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Figure 5.2: Marginal Effects of the Court Cohesion Interaction Term, Total Policy Model with State Characteristics 
Figure 5.3 shows the marginal effects for legislative cohesion interaction term and, since 
only the most smallest and polarized values of legislative cohesion are statistically significant, 
additional policies cause public opinion on homosexuality to liberalize by roughly 1.5 points on 
the homosexuality attitude scale, but only when cohesion in the state legislature is moderately 
cohesive or partisan.  Figure 5.4 displays the marginal effects of the partisan control of state 
legislatures interaction term with lagged total gay rights policies.  Both values of the partisan 
control dummy are significant, meaning that regardless of which party controls the state 
legislature, additional policies induce a liberal opinion change by an average of 1.25 on the 
homosexuality attitude score across the gay rights policy scale (from -5 to 5).  
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Figure 5.3: Marginal Effects of the Legislative Cohesion Interaction Term, Total Policy Model with State 
Characteristics 
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Figure 5.4: Marginal Effects of the Partisan Control of the State Legislature Interaction Term, Total Policy Model 
with State Characteristics 
Figure 5.5 shows the marginal effects of the citizen ideology interaction term with total 
gay rights policies.  Postestimation analysis reveals that the effect of policy on opinion is only 
statistically significant when citizen ideology is liberal (specifically, citizen ideology at levels of 
0-25).  The graph shows that as progressive policies are added in the states, overall opinion 
becomes more tolerant when citizen ideology is liberal.  Specifically, the influence of policy on 
opinion is associated with a 1.5 increase on the homosexuality attitude score when the state 
citizenry is liberal: from an average response of homosexuality is always wrong (when policy is -
5) to homosexuality is wrong only sometimes (when policy is 5).  When citizen ideology is
moderate or conservative, however, the effect of policy on opinion is statistically 
indistinguishable from zero.  
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Figure 5.5: Marginal Effects of the Citizen Ideology Interaction Term, Total Policy Model with State 
Characteristics 
Figure 5.6 displays the marginal effects of the only interaction term from Model 2 of 
Table 5.2 – the institutional policy venue model – to reach statistical significance, citizen 
ideology.  Postestimation analysis reveals that only conservative citizen ideology (values 75-100) 
is statistically significant, meaning that when the electorate is strongly conservative and a 
progressive/liberal policy originates in the state government institutions of the court or 
legislature – not from the people (the reference category) – then a backlash against that liberal 
policy ensues.  This means that when policy origination point is taken into account and the 
government institutions behave contrary to the will of a conservative citizenry, then backlash is 
the outcome – a polar opposite finding from the marginal effects presented in Figure 5.5.  
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Figure 5.6: Marginal Effects of the Citizen Ideology Interaction Term, Institutional Venue Model with State 
Characteristics 
Furthermore, and central to my theory and hypotheses, various lagged policies reach 
statistical significance in the state-level characteristic model specifications.  In Model 2, lagged 
policy originating in the state legislature reaches statistical significance at the 0.10 level and the 
coefficient for the variable is 0.116.  This means that adding an additional policy at t-1 bumps 
homosexuality attitudes by 0.116.  The legislative policy variable itself ranges from -2 to 2, 
meaning that moving from 0 to 2 progressive gay rights policies resulting from state legislatures 
results in 0.232 increase in homosexuality attitude while moving from 0 to 2 traditional gay 
rights policies results in 0.232 decrease in homosexuality attitude, which means going from 2 
traditionally conservative gay rights policies to 2 progressive gay rights policies results in a 
0.464 change on the homosexuality score, or nearly a half a point on the 4-point scale.  
Furthermore, lagged policy originating in the state courts reaches statistical significance 
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at the 0.05 level and the coefficient for the variable is 0.149.  This means that adding an 
additional policy at t-1 bumps homosexuality attitudes by 0.149.  The court policy variable itself 
ranges from -1 to 3, meaning that moving from 0 to 3 progressive gay rights policies resulting 
from state legislatures results in 0.447 increase in homosexuality attitude while moving from 0 to 
1 traditional gay rights policies results in 0.149 decrease in homosexuality attitude, which means 
going from 1 traditionally conservative gay rights policies to 3 progressive gay rights policies 
results in a 0.596 change on the homosexuality score, or more than a half a point on the 4-point 
scale.  
Turning to the random parameters of Models 1 and 2 in Table 5.2, the variance 
component associated with the average intercept of the models is 0.191 and 0.193, respectively.  
Since these estimates are substantially larger than their standard error (about 7 times larger), 
there appears to be significant variation in average attitude toward homosexuality across states.  
The two main variance components (associated with the intercept and the residual) can be used 
to partition the variance across levels. The intrastate correlation coefficient is equal to 
0.191/(1.174+0.191)=0.140 in Model 1 and 0.193/(1.174+0.193)=0.141 in Model 2, meaning 
that roughly 14% of the variance is attributable to the state-level.  Further, the variance 
component associated with the year count can be used to partition the variance associated with 
time. The coefficient associated with time is equal to 0.015/(1.174+0.015)=0.013 in Model 1 and 
0.014/(1.174+0.014)=0.012 in Model 2, meaning that roughly 1.3% and 1.2% of the variance in 
Models 1 and 2 is attributable to time. 
Now turning to Models 3 and 4 in Table 5.2, which add individual-level characteristics to 
the previously estimated Models 1 (total policy influence on opinion) and 2 (institutional policy 
source on opinion), the models are both statistically significant as indicated by the strength and 
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significance of the χ2 terms.  Looking first at the fixed parameters, the coefficient on the constant 
is the homosexuality attitude value when all independent variables are at 0.  With the addition of 
the individual characteristics, this means that 0.419/0.427 is the attitude score for a 45.5 year old 
white man with some college education but no degree, who is a Republican Protestant who never 
attends church, living in a state with zero progressive gay rights policies, a strongly conservative 
elite body, an ideologically moderate state court of last resort, an equal number of Democrats 
and Republicans in a state legislature controlled by Democrats, a strongly conservative citizenry, 
and when the average national response to homosexuality is a 0 – homosexuality is always 
wrong – in the year 1973.  0.444/0.451 indicates that the large share of respondents indicate that 
homosexuality is always wrong. 
The year count variable is once again insignificant and the average national 
homosexuality attitude is significant. The coefficient on the homosexuality trend variable is 
0.879 and 0.884 meaning that a one-unit increase in the national homosexuality attitude is 
associated with a 0.879 and 0.884 increase in individual attitudes. As compared to Models 1 and 
2, the effect of the national homosexuality trend is slightly depressed (from just over a one-unit 
change to just under a one-unit change) due to the addition of individual level characteristics and, 
therefore, not being conflated with the other variables in the model. 
With respect to the state characteristics in Model 3 of Table 5.2, I once again turn to a 
series of graphs.  Figures 5.7-5.10 display the marginal effects for each of the state characteristic 
interaction terms in Model 3.  The relevant comparison figures to the interaction graphs below 
are Figures 5.1-5.5.  For the most part, the statistical significance of the interactions in Model 3 
are the same as in Model 1, unless otherwise noted below. 
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Figure 5.7 displays the marginal effects of the elite ideology interaction term from Model 
3 of Table 5.2.  In comparing Figure 5.7 to Figure 5.1, which shows the same interaction term 
but in the absence of individual characteristics, it is clear that the addition of individual 
characteristics into the model does not alter the impact of elite ideology on the opinion-policy 
relationship.   
Figure 5.7: Marginal Effects of the Elite Ideology Interaction Term, Total Policy Model with State and Individual 
Characteristics 
Figures 5.8-5.11 display the marginal effects for the institutional cohesion variables in 
Model 3 of Table 5.2.  Figure 5.8 shows the marginal effects for the court cohesion interaction 
term and, since all values of court cohesion are statistically significant, additional policies cause 
public opinion on homosexuality to liberalize by an average of 1 point on the homosexuality 
attitude score scale regardless of the level of cohesion on the court.  In comparing Figure 5.8 to 
Figure 5.2, which shows the same interaction term but in the absence of individual 
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characteristics, the addition of individual characteristics into the model causes all levels of 
cohesion to converge as progressive policies are added. 
Figure 5.8: Marginal Effects of the Court Cohesion Interaction Term, Total Policy Model with State and Individual 
Characteristics 
Figure 5.9 shows the marginal effects for the legislative cohesion interaction term.  Two 
noteworthy differences exist between the legislative cohesion interactions from Models 1 and 3 
of Table 5.2 and displayed in Figures 5.9 and 5.3.  The addition of individual characteristics to 
the model cause (1) all values of legislative cohesion to reach statistical significance and (2) the 
predictions for homosexual attitudes all converge together meaning that additional policies cause 
public opinion on homosexuality to liberalize by roughly 1.5 points on the homosexuality 
attitude scale for all levels of legislative cohesion.  This means that the policy-opinion trend is 
generally the same across all levels of legislative cohesion. 
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Figure 5.9: Marginal Effects of the Legislative Cohesion Interaction Term, Total Policy Model with State and 
Individual Characteristics 
Figure 5.10 displays the marginal effects of the partisan control of state legislatures 
interaction term for the total policy model with both state and individual level characteristics 
(Table 5.2, Model 3).   In comparing Figure 5.10 to Figure 5.4, which shows the same interaction 
term but in the absence of individual characteristics, it is clear that the addition of individual 
characteristics into the model does not alter the impact of partisan control of the state legislature 
on the opinion-policy relationship.  
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Figure 5.10: Marginal Effects of the Partisan Control Interaction Term, Total Policy Model with State and 
Individual Characteristics 
Figure 5.11 shows the marginal effects of the citizen ideology interaction term with total 
gay rights policies in the total policy model with state and individual characteristics.  As in 
Figure 5.5, which shows the same interaction term in the absence of individual characteristics, 
the effect of policy on opinion is only statistically significant when citizen ideology is liberal 
(specifically, citizen ideology at levels of 0-25): as progressive policies are added in the states, 
overall opinion becomes more tolerant when citizen ideology is liberal.  The only slight 
difference is that the predicted homosexuality score for 5 traditionally conservative gay rights 
policies (-5) is roughly .25 lower in Figure 5.11 than 5.5. 
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Figure 5.11: Marginal Effects of the Citizen Ideology Interaction Term, Total Policy Model with State and 
Individual Characteristics 
In order to determine the influence of the various policy sources, Model 4 of Table 5.2 
includes variables for institutional policy source: state legislatures, state courts, and direct 
democracy processes.  In this model, none of the institutional policy venue variables reach 
statistical significance, meaning that their effects on opinion are indistinguishable from zero.  
Furthermore, turning to the other state-level characteristics, the only interaction term to reach 
statistical significance is citizen ideology.  Figure 5.12 displays the marginal effects for the 
citizen ideology interaction term in the institutional venue model including both state and 
individual level characteristics.  As in Figure 5.6, the interaction between gay rights policies and 
citizen ideology is only a significant predictor of homosexuality attitude when the electorate is 
conservative.  The two noteworthy differences between Figure 5.6 and 5.12 are (1) when policy 
venue is controlled for, the addition of a progressive policy leads to less support for 
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homosexuality, but only when the citizenry is very conservative (scores of 90-100) and (2) the 
citizen ideology interaction effect is depressed when individual level variables are added to the 
model, as in Figure 5.12. 
Figure 5.12: Marginal Effects of the Citizen Ideology Interaction Term, Institutional Venue Model with State and 
Individual Characteristics 
As discussed in the last chapter, several individual-level characteristics are important to 
determining homosexuality attitudes. Regarding these individual-level characteristics, being 
above-average age, African American, Republican, a frequent church attender, and/or having 
below-average education level decreases support for homosexuality.  Conversely, being female, 
secular, Jewish, Catholic, Democratic, younger than average, a non-frequent church attender, 
and/or having above-average education increases support for homosexuality.  All of these results, 
with the exception of Catholics being more supportive of homosexuality, are expected based on 
the literature on support for homosexuality and gay individuals.  Perhaps for many Catholics 
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included in the GSS sample over 35 years, homosexuality is viewed through a social justice 
perspective rather than a traditional doctrinal perspective.  Additionally, many American 
Catholics consider themselves culturally Catholic or “cafeteria-style” Catholics, picking and 
choosing the doctrines to which they adhere (Ekelund, Hebert, and Tollison 2006), thereby 
leading to greater acceptance of homosexuality and a rejection of official Church positions. 
Turning to the random parameters of Models 3 and 4 in Table 5.2, the variance 
component associated with the average intercept of the models is 0.109 and 0.108, respectively.  
Since these estimates are substantially larger than their standard error (about 5 times larger), 
there appears to be significant variation in average attitude toward homosexuality across states.  
The two main variance components (associated with the intercept and the residual) can be used 
to partition the variance across levels. The intrastate correlation coefficient is equal to 
0.109/(1.068+0.109)=0.093, meaning that roughly 9.3% of the variance is attributable to the 
state-level.  Further, the variance component associated with the year count can be used to 
partition the variance associated with time. The coefficient associated with time is equal to 
0.010/(1.068+0.010)=0.009, meaning that nearly 1% of the variance is attributable to time. 
5.3 ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
My primary concern in this dissertation is whether institutions are capable of leading public 
opinion.  This concern is complicated by a potential reciprocal relationship between my primary 
variables of interest – public policy and public opinion – and the related endogeneity that arises 
from the link between policy and opinion. A skeptic may say that the preceding analyses do not 
prove anything beyond an existing relationship that could, in fact, be stronger in the reverse 
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direction (that is, homosexuality attitudes could be the driving force behind the changing policies 
and that political elites are wise enough to see the writing on the wall and adopt policies 
proactively).   This concern warrants further consideration and two robustness checks will be 
performed in the pages to follow.  
5.3.1 Check #1: Testing the Reverse Relationship 
The first check of robustness is a methodological exploration of the opposite relationship: lagged 
public opinion’s influence on public policy.  In an effort to test for reciprocal effects, I have run a 
series of multilevel models found in Table 5.3 in which the state policy is the dependent variable 
and homosexuality attitude at t-1 is the key independent variable.  Since I am interested in 
overall policy and policy originating in the various institutions, six different model specifications 
are presented in Table 5.3.
20
20
 I could not run the robustness check for policies originating via direct democracy because there were not enough 
observations available to yield reliable estimates. 
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Table 5.3: Reciprocal Relationship  Mixed Models of State- and Individual-level Characteristics’ Impact on State 
Policy 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Total Policy Total Policy 
Policy from 
State 
Legislature 
Policy from 
State 
Legislature 
Policy from 
State Courts 
Policy from 
State Courts 
Fixed Parameters 
Homosexuality Attitudet-1 
0.048 
(0.090) 
0.048 
(0.089) 
0.014 
(0.079) 
0.014 
(0.079) 
0.034 
(0.023) 
0.035 
(0.023) 
Elite Ideology 
0.003 
(0.003) 
0.003 
(0.003) 
0.003 
(0.003) 
0.003 
(0.003) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
Court Cohesion 
-0.005 
(0.004) 
-0.005 
(0.005) 
-0.005 
(0.005) 
-0.005 
(0.005) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
Legislative Cohesion 
0.039 
(0.295) 
0.027 
(0.298) 
0.000 
(0.290) 
-0.011 
(0.294) 
0.037 
(0.034) 
0.035 
(0.033) 
Republican Control of 
Legislature 
0.049 
(0.049) 
0.048 
(0.048) 
0.052 
(0.049) 
0.051 
(0.048) 
-0.004 
(0.006) 
-0.004 
(0.006) 
Citizen Ideology 
-0.010 
(0.007) 
-0.010 
(0.007) 
-0.009 
(0.007) 
-0.009 
(0.007) 
-0.002 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
National Homosexuality 
Attitude Trend 
-0.197 
(0.360) 
-0.203 
(0.362) 
-0.080 
(0.256) 
-0.087 
(0.260) 
-0.116 
(0.141) 
-0.114 
(0.141) 
Year Count 
0.049* 
(0.020) 
0.049* 
(0.020) 
0.051** 
(0.019) 
0.051** 
(0.019) 
-0.002 
(0.006) 
-0.002 
(0.005) 
Age (centered around the 
mean for the sample) 
- 
0.000 
(0.000) 
- 
0.000 
(0.000) 
- 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
Female 
- -0.001 
(0.004) 
- -0.002 
(0.004) 
- 
0.000 
(0.001) 
Education (centered 
around the mean for the 
sample) 
- 
0.003* 
(0.001) 
- 
0.002+ 
(0.001) 
- 
0.000 
(0.000) 
African American 
- 0.018 
(0.013) 
- 0.018 
(0.013) 
- 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
Party ID 
- -0.000 
(0.001) 
- 0.000 
(0.001) 
- 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
Church Attendance 
- -0.001 
(0.001) 
- -0.001 
(0.001) 
- 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
Secular 
- 0.004 
(0.011) 
- 0.001 
(0.012) 
- 
0.003 
(0.002) 
Jewish 
- 0.016 
(0.028) 
- 0.013 
(0.026) 
- 
0.003 
(0.005) 
Catholic 
- 0.005 
(0.009) 
- 0.006 
(0.009) 
- 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
Constant 
0.563 
(0.612) 
0.583 
(0.623) 
0.361 
(0.475) 
0.382 
(0.487) 
0.197 
(0.227) 
0.196 
(0.229) 
Random Parameters 
sd (slope) 
0.103 
(0.013) 
0.103 
(0.013) 
0.095 
(0.012) 
0.094 
(0.012) 
0.040 
(0.014) 
0.039 
(0.014) 
sd (intercept) 
0.480 
(0.076) 
0.481 
(0.076) 
0.464 
(0.077) 
0.465 
(0.077) 
0.051 
(0.012) 
0.052 
(0.012) 
sd (residual) 
0.237 
(0.038) 
0.238 
(0.038) 
0.228 
(0.039) 
0.229 
(0.039) 
0.052 
(0.016) 
0.052 
(0.016) 
Observations 13319 12860 13319 12860 13319 12860 
 117 
Table 5.3 (continued) 
Groups 41 41 41 41 41 41 
Min Obs per Group 19 18 19 18 19 18 
Avg Obs per Group 324.9 313.7 324.9 313.7 324.9 313.7 
Max Obs per Group 1396 1353 1396 1353 1396 1353 
Wald χ2 (8, 17, 8, 17, 8, 
17)  
20.46 
28.99 
20.86 25.95 3.40 4.99 
Prob > Wald χ2 0.009 0.035 0.008 0.075 0.907 0.998 
Log Pseudolikelihood 8.90 -17.14 526.92 474.77 20313.36 19575.35 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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When looking at the six model specifications in Table 5.3, only model specifications 1-4 
reach statistical significance, as indicated by the strength and significance of the χ2 terms 
(though Model 4 is only marginally significant).  The results demonstrate that relatively few 
variables in the model are statistically significant.  In fact, the only variable that is significant 
across all models is the year counter.  Further, education is the only individual-level variable that 
is predictive – and marginally, at that – of the number of gay rights policies present in a state.  
Lagged public opinion on homosexuality is not significant in any of the model specifications.  
Turning to the random parameters of the models in Table 5.3, the variance component 
associated with the average intercept of Models 1-4 are 0.480, 0.481, 0.464, and 0.465, 
respectively.  Since all of these estimates are substantially larger than their standard error, there 
appears to be significant variation in the average policy profile across states.  The two main 
variance components (associated with the intercept and the residual) can be used to partition the 
variance across levels. Using the same equation detailed in earlier models presented, I find that 
roughly 66.9%, 66.9%, 67.1%, and 67.1% of the overall variance is attributable to the state-level 
for Models 1-4.  Further, the variance component associated with the year count can be used to 
partition the variance associated with time. Using the same equations detailed in earlier 
multilevel models reveals that 30.3%, 30.2%, 29.4%, and 29.1% of the variance is attributable to 
time in Models 1-4. 
The first check of robustness suggests that my findings that the relationship between 
opinion and policy is in my hypothesized direction and not the reverse. 
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5.3.2 Check #2: Instrumental Variable Estimation 
In the models presented on the previous pages, an underlying assumption is that the error term is 
zero and not associated with any of the variables in the model.  Methodologically, the problem of 
endogeneity occurs because of association between an independent variable and the error term 
associated with the econometric equation.  Given the plausible scenario that there is correlation 
between the error term and my key independent variable, public policy at t-1, since there are 
significant concerns of reverse causality, the use of an additional methodology to further 
examine the exact nature of the relationship among and between the variables and the error term 
becomes necessary as a check on robustness.  As such, I have run my models with two-stage 
least squares (2SLS).  
In order to use 2SLS, I need to first find an instrumental variable that is correlated with 
the endogenous variable (policy at t-1) yet unrelated to the error term.  Common practice in the 
political science literature is to use a further back lag of the offending variable (see Sovey and 
Green 2012 for details on the most common types of instrumental variables used in political 
science) as a proxy to correct for the endogeneity problem.  Lags are commonly used as 
instrumental variables because the longer time period allows for the effect to be diffused and, 
therefore, not directly related to the dependent variable.  Therefore, I have selected public policy 
at t-2 as my instrumental variable for use in 2SLS.  Public policy at t-2 is highly correlated with 
public policy at t-1 (.963), but there is no explicit reason to assume that policy two years ago 
would be a significant predictor of attitudes today.  Results of the 2SLS models are found in 
Tables 5.4-5.6.  
Tables 5.4 and 5.5 present results of the original fixed effects models (1 and 3) alongside 
the same models estimated with instrumental variables (2 and 4).  The fixed effects models in 
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Table 5.4 serve as the bluntest test of the time-varying lagged policy’s impact on individual 
homosexuality attitudes since they include dummy variables for each state in the dataset, which 
control for any time invariant factors specific to the various states that could account for changes 
in individual homosexuality attitudes.  The models also include time trends specific to each state 
(state*year count), which control for anything occurring over the years in the individual states 
that could account for variations in homosexuality attitudes.  The inclusion of state dummies and 
state time trend dummies holds constant all time invariant factors, essentially dropping them 
from the model, and a statistically significant independent variable means that variable has an 
impact on individual attitudes over and above anything specific to the individual states, years, or 
state-year events.  It is for this reason that fixed effects models are the most stringent test of 
significance.  In the first two specifications, total policy is insignificant in the original fixed 
effects model and marginally significant (at 0.10 level) in the 2SLS model.  In the second two 
specifications, policy originating in the state legislature is marginally significant in both the 
original model and the 2SLS model, and policy originating in state courts or though direct 
democracy are insignificant.  The 2SLS results largely confirm my original model specification 
and suggest that there is no endogeneity problem with my key independent variable, public 
policy at t-1.  The fixed effects models in Table 5.5 are similar to those in 5.4, but they include 
region dummies and time trends instead of state dummies and time trends.  The 2SLS results in 
Table 5.5 further confirm that my model is appropriate, suggesting a minimal endogeneity 
problem.  
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Table 5.4: 2SLS Fixed Effects Model of Lagged Policy Impact on Individual Homosexuality Attitudes, States 
Model 
(1) 
FE 
(2) 
2SLS, FE 
(3) 
FE 
(4) 
2SLS, FE 
Total Policyt-1 
0.041 
(0.029) 
0.052** 
(0.018) 
- - 
Policy from State 
Legislature t-1 
- 
- 0.060+ 
(0.032) 
0.081*** 
(0.022) 
Policy from State 
Court t-1 
- 
- 0.061 
(0.106) 
0.065 
(0.081) 
Policy from Direct 
Democracy t-1 
- 
- -0.035 
(0.040) 
-0.043 
(0.032) 
Year Count 
-0.181*** 
(0.014) 
-0.186 
(0.129) 
-0.191*** 
(0.030) 
-0.197 
(0.131) 
Constant 
1.592*** 
(0.001) 
1.593*** 
(0.013) 
1.596*** 
(0.005) 
1.597*** 
(0.014) 
Observations 30176 30176 30176 30176 
Groups 48 48 48 48 
Min Obs per Group 37 37 37 37 
Avg Obs per Group 628.7 628.7 628.7 628.7 
Max Obs per Group 2938 2938 2938 2938 
Wald χ2 (49, 51) - 72102.27 - 72113.96 
Prob > Wald χ2 - 0.000 - 0.000 
Corr (u_i, Xb) -0.396 -0.405 -0.422 -0.435 
Within R
2
 0.045 0.045 0.045 0.045 
Between R
2
 0.014 0.013 0.011 0.011 
Overall R
2
 0.033 0.032 0.031 0.031 
sigma_u 0.916 0.929 0.945 0.961 
sigma_e 1.176 1.176 1.176 1.176 
rho 0.377 0.384 0.392 0.400 
F test (47, 28701) - 14.78 - 13.99 
Prob > F - 0.000 - 0.000 
Models also includes 47 constants, consisting of state*year in order to account for any time trends occurring in the 
individual states.  Full results are available in Appendix. 
Standard errors in parentheses 
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Table 5.5: 2SLS Fixed Effects Models of Lagged Policy Impact on Individual Homosexuality Attitudes, Regional 
Model 
(1) 
FE 
(2) 
2SLS, FE 
(3) 
FE 
(4) 
2SLS 
Total Policyt-1 
0.041+ 
(0.022) 
0.066*** 
(0.016) 
- 
- 
Policy from 
Legislature t-1 
- - 
0.067** 
(0.023) 
0.131*** 
(0.026) 
Policy from Court t-1 - - 
0.040 
(0.051) 
-0.011 
(0.053) 
Policy from Direct 
Democracy t-1 
- - 
-0.038 
(0.036) 
-0.105 
(0.072) 
Year Count 
0.029*** 
(0.003) 
0.026*** 
(0.003) 
0.027*** 
(0.003) 
0.022*** 
(0.004) 
New England * Count 
0.005 
(0.006) 
0.002 
(0.006) 
0.005 
(0.007) 
0.006 
(0.007) 
Mid-Atlantic * Count 
0.004 
(0.004) 
0.005 
(0.004) 
0.005 
(0.003) 
0.008* 
(0.004) 
East North Central * 
Count 
0.008+ 
(0.004) 
(0.012)** 
(0.004) 
0.008+ 
(0.004) 
0.011** 
(0.004) 
West North Central * 
Count 
0.015 
(0.013) 
0.018*** 
(0.005) 
0.017 
(0.012) 
0.019*** 
(0.005) 
South Atlantic * Count 
0.002 
(0.005) 
0.005 
(0.004) 
0.004 
(0.005) 
0.009** 
(0.004) 
East South Central * 
Count 
-0.009* 
(0.004) 
-0.006 
(0.005) 
-0.007+ 
(0.004) 
-0.002 
(0.005) 
West South Central * 
Count 
-0.007 
(0.006) 
-0.002 
(0.005) 
-0.007 
(0.006) 
-0.002 
(0.005) 
Mountain * Count 
0.025** 
(0.009) 
0.028*** 
(0.006) 
0.027*** 
(0.008) 
0.032*** 
(0.006) 
Constant 
1.584*** 
(0.010) 
1.588*** 
(0.010) 
1.587*** 
(0.010) 
1.596*** 
(0.011) 
Observations 30176 28759 30176 28759 
Groups 48 48 48 48 
Min Obs per Group 37 37 37 37 
Avg Obs per Group 628.7 599.1 628.7 599.1 
Max Obs per Group 2938 2782 2938 2782 
Wald χ2 (10, 12) - 68379.07 - 68365.68 
Prob > Wald χ2 - 0.000 - 0.000 
F (10,47/) 89.44 - 129.10 - 
Prob > F 0.000 - 0.000 - 
Corr (u_i, Xb) 0.068 0.077 0.077 0.088 
Within R
2
 0.0409 0.040 0.041 0.040 
Between R
2
 0.386 0.348 0.377 0.356 
Overall R
2
 0.051 0.051 0.053 0.053 
Sigma_u 0.289 0.298 0.291 0.297 
Sigma_e 1.178 1.186 1.178 1.186 
rho 0.057 0.059 0.057 0.059 
F test (47, 
28701/28699) 
- 17.71 
- 
17.14 
Prob > F - 0.000 - 0.000 
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For comparison purposes, pacific is the omitted region. 
Standard errors in parentheses 
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Table 5.6 presents the results of a fixed effects model of the influence of public policy on 
state and individual level characteristics and should be compared to the results of the multilevel 
models found in Table 5.2.  While the two models are not fully compatible since the former are 
fixed effects regressions and the latter are multilevel regression models, they are useful in order 
to assess the robustness of my key independent variable, policy at t-1.  In both types of models – 
multilevel regression and 2SLS – total policy (specifications 1 and 3) and policy originating from 
the state legislatures and state courts are statistically significant (specification 2) and in the same 
direction.  This further suggests that endogeneity is not a significant problem in my models.  
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Table 5.6: 2SLS Fixed Effects Model of State- and Individual-level Characteristics’ Impact on Individual 
Homosexuality Attitudes 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Total Policyt-1 
0.201** 
(0.072) 
-0.161 
(0.133) 
0.155* 
(0.067) 
-0.089 
(0.123) 
Policy from 
Legislature t-1 
- 
0.288* 
(0.123) 
- 
0.200+ 
(0.114) 
Policy from Court t-1 - 
0.330* 
(0.134) 
- 
0.194 
(0.124) 
Policy from Direct 
Democracy t-1 
- 
0.097* 
(0.050) 
- 
0.032 
(0.046) 
Elite Ideology 
-0.001 
(0.000) 
-0.001+ 
(0.000) 
-0.001 
(0.000) 
-0.001 
(0.000) 
Elite Ideology * Total 
Policy 
0.001+ 
(0.000) 
0.001** 
(0.000) 
0.001* 
(0.000) 
0.001** 
(0.000) 
Court Cohesion 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
Court Cohesion * 
Total Policy 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
Legislative Cohesion 
0.159** 
(0.056) 
0.091 
(0.062) 
0.162** 
(0.052) 
0.119* 
(0.058) 
Legislative Cohesion * 
Total Policy 
0.030 
(0.046) 
0.010 
(0.048) 
0.084+ 
(0.043) 
0.072 
(0.044) 
Republican Control of 
Legislature 
-0.009 
(0.024) 
0.008 
(0.025) 
-0.009 
(0.022) 
0.001 
(0.023) 
Republican Control * 
Total Policy 
-0.041* 
(0.019) 
-0.005 
(0.023) 
-0.024 
(0.018) 
0.005 
(0.021) 
Citizen Ideology 
0.002 
(0.001) 
0.002+ 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
Citizen Ideology * 
Total Policy 
-0.004** 
(0.001) 
-0.003** 
(0.001) 
-0.003** 
(0.001) 
-0.002* 
(0.001) 
National 
Homosexuality 
Attitude Trend 
0.991*** 
(0.102) 
0.999*** 
(0.102) 
0.829*** 
(0.094) 
0.848*** 
(0.095) 
Year Count 
0.001 
(0.004) 
-0.001 
(0.004) 
-0.002 
(0.004) 
-0.004 
(0.004) 
Age (centered around 
the mean for the 
sample) 
- - 
-0.007*** 
(0.000) 
-0.007*** 
(0.000) 
Female - - 
0.189*** 
(0.013) 
0.188*** 
(0.013) 
Education (centered 
around the mean for 
the sample) 
- - 
0.082*** 
(0.002) 
0.082*** 
(0.002) 
African American - - 
-0.187*** 
(0.020) 
-0.187*** 
(0.020) 
Party ID - - 
-0.058*** 
(0.003) 
-0.058*** 
(0.003) 
Church Attendance - - 
-0.090*** 
(0.003) 
-0.090*** 
(0.003) 
Secular - - 
0.497*** 
(0.024) 
0.495*** 
(0.024) 
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Table 5.6 (continued) 
Jewish - - 
0.758*** 
(0.048) 
0.759*** 
(0.048) 
Catholic - - 
0.125*** 
(0.016) 
0.126*** 
(0.016) 
Constant 
-0.070 
(0.188) 
-0.073 
(0.190) 
0.696*** 
(0.176) 
0.671*** 
(0.177) 
Observations 30176 30176 29158 29158 
Groups 48 48 48 48 
Min Obs per Group 37 37 36 36 
Avg Obs per Group 628.7 628.7 607.5 607.5 
Max Obs per Group 2938 2938 2815 2815 
Wald χ2 (13, 16, 22, 
25) 
71992.02 72014.40 89802.12 89824.03 
Prob > Wald χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Corr (u_i, Xb) 0.040 0.088 0.160 0.177 
Within R
2
 0.043 0.044 0.206 0.207 
Between R
2
 0.387 0.465 0.778 0.812 
Overall R
2
 0.048 0.054 0.230 0.232 
Sigma_u 0.297 0.283 0.200 0.188 
Sigma_e 1.177 1.177 1.070 1.070 
rho 0.060 0.055 0.034 0.030 
F test (47, 
30115/30112/29088/29
085) 
12.50 12.04 6.37 6.09 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Standard errors in parentheses 
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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In sum, while significant questions exist regarding reverse causality and the exact nature 
of the policy-opinion relationship, I consistently find that policy influences opinion when that 
policy originates in the state legislature – even when the model is specified with fixed effects, 
biasing me against a statistically significant finding.  
5.4 DISCUSSION 
To summarize the preceding results, policy changes public opinion even when controlling for a 
wide variety of factors including anything occurring in the various states (from the fixed effects 
models), anything occurring within any given year (also from the fixed effects models), any time 
trend present in the various states and at the national level (from both fixed effects and multilevel 
models), and even state and individual level characteristics (also from both fixed effects and 
multilevel models).  This means that state governments are able to lead the public opinion of 
their citizens simply through the adoption of policy.  Mere exposure to policy – that is, citizens 
need not be aware of the policy stimuli in order to be influenced by it – proves to be a potent 
presence.  Policy serves as a legitimizing effect on public opinion in all but one of the state 
environments explored herein.  Therefore, Hypotheses 1.1 – public policy is more likely to cause 
legitimation in public opinion when the debate in the public sphere is cohesive and one-sided – 
and 1.2 – public policy is more likely to cause legitimation in public opinion when cohesion in 
the political body where the policy originated is high – gain support from the statistical analyses 
conducted in this chapter.  As policies are added (in either a progressive or conservative 
direction), public opinion moves in the same direction.  
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The one noted exception to the legitimizing effect is when the state citizenry is very 
conservative.  When this is the case, as state government adds policies that are at odds with the 
preferences of the conservative citizenry, a backlash effect is the outcome such that policies 
move in one direction (progressive) and opinion moves in the opposite (conservative).   That 
means that Hypothesis 2.1 – public policy is more likely to cause backlash in public opinion 
when the public debate surrounding the issue is strongly opposed to the institutional policy 
position – gains support from the empirical analysis, while Hypotheses 2.2 – backlash is more 
likely to occur among public opinion when the policy originates from the state legislature than 
when the policy originates in the state judiciary – and 4.1 – since public policy originating from 
direct democracy theoretically comes from the public, it will have no effect on public opinion – 
fail to find support.  
Furthermore, the results suggest that state institutions can serve as opinion leaders on 
homosexuality through the adoption of state policy.  Specifically, state legislatures seem to have 
some ability to lead public opinion, though much more research must be done in order to fully 
understand the mechanism through which they moderate the policy-opinion relationship.  In 
every model but one (Model 4 of Table 5.2) policy from the state legislature is a statistically 
significant predictor of homosexuality attitude, consistent with Bartels and Mutz (2009).  This 
finding holds even when controlling for anything occurring in the various states, anything 
occurring within any given year, any time trend present in the various states, and even state and 
individual level characteristics.  Policy from the state legislatures, therefore, leads to a 
legitimizing effect on public opinion, once again confirming Hypotheses 1.1 and 1.2 with respect 
to state legislatures, but providing no support for Hypothesis 1.3, which hypothesized that 
legitimation would only occur when policy originated in the state courts. 
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The empirical results produce conflicting results with respect to state court and direct 
democracy’s impact on public opinion.  Policy originating in state courts is a statistically 
significant predictor of homosexuality attitude in two models: institutional policy source 
multilevel model with only state characteristics (Model 2 of Table 5.2) and the 2SLS robustness 
check of this model (Model 2 of Table 5.6).  Once individual characteristics are added to the 
multilevel models, the influence of policy originating in the state court system washes away.  
Policy originating via direct democracy reaches statistical significance only in the 2SLS 
robustness check of my main models.  These contradictory and conflicting results demonstrate 
the need to further investigate the role of institutional venue in attitude change.   
One possible reason for the finding that state legislatures are able to lead public opinion 
is likely due to issue visibility.  Policies that tend to originate in the state legislatures may not be 
as visible as the policies resulting from state courts (mostly highly controversial issues such as 
same-sex marriage), but are highly impactful on the daily lives of citizens.  Revisiting Table 4.1 
shows that anti-discrimination policies and hate crime protection policies uniformly originated in 
the state legislatures.  These policies most closely impacted the daily lives of gay residents in the 
states, serving to make them more secure in their jobs, their relationships, and their lives; this 
greater sense of security no doubt led more and more gay and lesbian citizens to “come out of the 
closet.”  As discussed in Chapter 2, one of the reasons attitudes toward homosexuality have 
warmed over the years is due to the fact that more people have come in contact with gays and 
lesbians.  As more gays and lesbians are secure in their lives, more of them are likely to reveal 
their sexual orientations to those around them, which led to wholesale warming of attitudes.  
Therefore, policy that originated in the state legislature started the long process of acceptance.  
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5.5 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, I sought to test the relationship between state-level gay rights policies and 
homosexuality attitudes of state citizens.  I found that state legislatures appear to have a strong 
influence over the homosexuality attitudes of state citizenry while the dynamics of policy 
originating in state courts and direct democracy are less obvious.  In my analyses, I tested for 
reciprocal effects by running models to test for the opposite relationship than the one I 
hypothesized.  In these models, I find no support for the contention that lagged opinion 
influences public policy.  This is in contrast to some findings in the political science literature 
(e.g., Lax and Phillips 2009), which warrants further exploration and will be discussed in greater 
detail in the next chapter. 
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6.0 CONCLUSION 
This dissertation explored the comparative ability of states – via state judiciaries, state 
legislatures, and direct democracy – to lead mass public opinion through the adoption of public 
policy.  My analysis reveals that states are capable of leading the opinion of its state citizens on 
homosexuality.  Since attitudes toward homosexuality reflect a general affective disposition and 
not a policy-specific opinion, the analysis herein finds that state governments can, in fact, change 
what is in the hearts and minds of citizens.  The empirical analysis shows state-level policies to 
be a potent force, withstanding multiple model specifications and robustness checks.  Specific to 
state institutions, my results indicate that state legislatures lead public opinion, direct democracy 
does not lead public opinion, and the results with respect to courts are inconclusive, requiring 
more research before determining their opinion leadership power.  In this chapter, I conclude the 
dissertation by tying together the theory developed in Chapters 1 and 3 with the empirical results 
revealed in Chapter 5.  
6.1 SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
At the outset of this dissertation, I described a number of reasons to believe that states could lead 
public opinion.  In Chapter 3, I detailed my hypotheses, which highlighted four potential 
consequences of policy on opinion (legitimation, backlash, polarization, no relationship) that 
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could be facilitated or inhibited by a number of institutional characteristics (specifically, 
institutional cohesion and cohesion of public debate).  My focus was on the influence that policy 
from specific sources (state court, state legislature, direct democracy) has on homosexuality 
opinions.  With guidance from existing political science literature, I expected state courts to have 
the greatest ability to influence public opinion toward their institutional position via policy 
adoption, interest groups to have no impact on public opinion via direct democracy, and state 
legislatures to be able to lead public opinion, but their opinion leadership power would be less 
influential than that of state courts.   
I conducted a series of empirical analyses in Chapter 5 in order to explore the impact of 
public policy – both in the aggregate and by institutional venue – on public opinion regarding 
homosexuality, based on time-series GSS data from 1973-2008.  I find that the mere existence of 
policy, regardless of its source, changes how citizens feel regarding homosexuality.  In most 
cases analyzed herein, policy induces public opinion regarding homosexuality to move in the 
same direction as the policy adoption, serving as a legitimizing agent.  This means that if a state 
passes a progressive policy protecting the rights of gays and lesbians, the citizens of that state 
become more positive in their evaluation of homosexuality the following year.  Per Table 4.1 and 
4.2, state institutions have been adopting more protective policies for gays and lesbians than at 
any other time point in history.   It follows then, that public opinion has also become more 
progressive through time.  Even when controlling for a number of state-level characteristics such 
as elite ideology, court cohesion, legislative cohesion, and partisan control of state legislature, 
public policy consistently serves as a legitimizing agent on public opinion regarding 
homosexuality.  
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This legitimation consequence of policy is a tremendous revelation not noted in the state 
politics literature heretofore.  Citizens may not even need to be aware of a policy’s existence; 
rather, through repeated exposure to the policy and its direct (e.g., banishing discrimination 
against gay and lesbian citizens) and indirect effects (e.g., gays and lesbians more willing to 
“come out” due to greater legal protections), citizen feelings become more positive toward 
homosexuality.  This legitimation means that public policy can, in fact, change what is in the 
hearts of their citizens, despite the warnings of President Dwight Eisenhower (noted in the 
opening paragraph of this dissertation) to the contrary.  
This legitimizing force holds in all but one scenario: when the state citizenry is very 
conservative.  When the overall citizen ideology in a state is very conservative, then the addition 
of protective policies for gays and lesbians results in less support for homosexuality.  This means 
that an opinion backlash occurs in states where state-level public policies and citizen ideology do 
not match.  Therefore, policy leads opinion regarding homosexuality in a multitude of ways.  In 
most scenarios, public policy legitimizes opinion, but in a very limited case, policy and opinion 
move in opposite directions.  
Contrary to my expectations, state courts are not the strongest institutional opinion 
leaders.  Established research at the federal level routinely finds that the highest federal court –
the Supreme Court – leads public opinion in a variety of policy areas (Baas and Thomas 1984; 
Hoekstra and Segal 1996).  Instead, the results in Chapter 5 with respect to state courts are 
inconclusive.  In some of the model specifications, state courts are a significant predictor of 
evaluations of homosexuality but not in all or even most of them.  There are two reasons that 
help to explain the unexpected futility of state courts to lead public opinion, both relating to 
drawbacks of my data analysis and structure.  First, perhaps I do not find evidence of state court 
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opinion leadership because my state court analysis is not nuanced enough.  State supreme court 
judges achieve (and retain) their positions through a variety of methods – appointment, partisan 
election, nonpartisan election, and the “merit plan” – and it could be the case that the different 
methods of selection lead to a differential ability to lead public opinion.  For example, judges 
initially selected via appointment may have an easier time adopting policy contrary to public 
opinion since they do not have to face the electorate, but their legitimacy may be lower than 
judges selected through elections.  
Second, the one-year policy lag I use to capture changes in public opinion in my models 
may not be long enough when policy originates in state courts.  The long delay between policy 
creation and policy effects being felt by the public are the result of two different factors.  First, 
due to their reactive (and not proactive) nature, courts must rely on the legislative and executive 
branches of state government to implement and enforce the policies they determine.  This 
process is not quick and/or easy.  Second, once state courts make a policy decision, there is the 
possibility of appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States.  Since issues of gay rights are 
frequently challenged and/or defended based on their relation to the equal protection clause, the 
full faith and credit clause, or provisions for federalism within the Constitution, they can and do 
get appealed to the Supreme Court.  Controversial state court decisions are rarely viewed as the 
final outcome, especially those highly visible decisions relating to the status of same-sex 
families. 
Another unexpected finding is that state legislatures are a strong force in changing the 
evaluations of homosexuality of state citizens.  Policy resulting from a state legislature must be 
implemented by the executive branch, but the process is usually much shorter than the process 
faced when policy originates in the state courts.  Once policy is passed in the legislature, the 
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policy is put into effect relatively quickly and citizens must live under the new status quo unless 
and until it is repealed by the legislature itself or until a court invalidates it. This gives an edge to 
state legislatures because citizens get a chance to personally experience the policy and then, if 
lives are not impacted adversely, attitudes can shift toward the institutional position. 
My results further indicate that policy originating via direct democracy has no discernible 
impact on public opinion.  In the past, direct democracy was a strategy utilized exclusively by 
opponents of gay marriage to bypass the courts and the political branches of government in order 
to restrict marriage to one man and one woman exclusively.  However, public sentiment has 
recently shifted toward a more pro-gay position,
21
 which means that direct democracy is not
guaranteed to produce an outcome that gay marriage opponents desire. Direct democracy may 
also be met with greater backlash.  In fact, voters in Arizona and Minnesota recently (2006 and 
2012) voted down constitutional amendments that would have banned same-sex marriage in their 
respective states.  On the contrary, voters in Maine approved a referendum establishing same-sex 
marriage.  
Lastly, I find little support for the reciprocal relationship that public opinion leads public 
policy on gay rights.  This non-finding is contrary to a number of political science scholars, 
including Lax and Phillips (2009), who look at policy responsiveness in the states on the topics 
of homosexuality and gay rights.  Lax and Phillips (2009) find a high level of policy 
responsiveness to policy-specific opinion.  That is, states respond to high levels of public support 
for same-sex marriage with a policy establishing same-sex marriage in the state.  My results 
differ from Lax and Phillips’ (2009) for a number of reasons.  First of all, we utilize different key 
variables.  Lax and Phillips’ dependent variable is a dummy variable indicating whether or not 
21
 The first national poll to indicate majority support for same-sex marriage (52%) was conducted by CNN and 
released on August 11, 2010. 
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states adopted specific types of gay rights policies; their key independent variable is policy-
specific opinion.  Therefore, Lax and Phillips are measuring responsiveness as the likelihood that 
a state will adopt a policy based on public support for that specific policy. This measure of 
responsiveness is an improvement over aggregate liberalism scores used by scholars such as 
Erikson, Wright, and McIver (1993) and Berry et al. (1998) because liberalism scores are 
indirect measures of opinion.  However, the specific opinion-specific policy link propagated by 
Lax and Phillips ignores the fact that elites and institutions can lead general attitudes (e.g., 
toward homosexuality) as well as policy-specific opinion (e.g., toward same-sex marriage).  Here 
in my dissertation, my measure of opinion as attitudes toward homosexuality strikes a balance 
between the general ideology scores of Erikson, Wright, and McIver and the specific opinion 
measures of Lax and Phillips. 
Second, while we are both looking at policy and opinion on gay rights, we are looking at 
different aspects of the relationship.  I am interested in exploring and explaining institutional 
opinion leadership while Lax and Phillips are interested in exploring and explaining policy 
responsiveness.  It could be the case that, under certain circumstances (or even when dealing 
with certain policies), institutional opinion leadership occurs and, under other circumstances, 
responsiveness occurs.  
Third, while we both look at institutional variations and the relationship between policy 
and opinion, Lax and Phillips examine characteristics of institutions (professionalism, etc.) but 
not the actual sources of policy to determine whether one is more effective/responsive than the 
others.  As my research shows, however, one of the institutional variations that conditions the 
relationship between opinion and policy is the policy source.   
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6.2 ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS 
Perhaps my results do not indicate a relationship between policy and opinion but rather a 
relationship between a third variable and my two key variables.  This potential spuriousness is a 
real issue with which I must contend.  There are two main sources that could potentially 
confound my findings: ideological culture of the state and interest group activity.  I will speak to 
each of these concerns in order.   
First, the ideological culture of the state could influence both policy and citizen opinions.  
While this is a possible scenario, my fixed effects analysis in Chapter 5 accounted for this 
possibility, though not explicitly.  The fixed effects models found in Table 5.1 account for any 
potentially confounding state-level factors, including the ideological culture of the various states.  
Even when accounting for these characteristics, policy from the state legislatures is statistically 
significant.  Additionally, region is a possible proxy for political culture.  Regional fixed effects 
models are presented in Table 5.5 and the results still hold. 
Second, interest group activity – particularly the Religious Right – could possibly 
influence both public policy and public opinion.  The argument is that interest groups reach out 
to citizens as well as the elites and so interest groups are actually driving the direction of policy 
and opinion.  While interest groups are certainly part of the political system, I am confident that 
they are not wholly responsible for the relationship revealed by my empirical analyses.  If 
interest groups were the driving force behind policy and opinion, I would expect that policy from 
all three sources – state legislatures, state courts, and direct democracy – would be significant 
(or, alternatively, insignificant) in my models.  Interest groups play a large role in the policy 
process regardless of the source.  Interest groups for and against gay rights sponsor cases brought 
to the state courts, lobby specific members and committees of state legislatures, and they 
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organize support for and sponsor specific ballot initiatives (Hansen 2011).  Therefore, if interest 
groups were the driving force behind policy and opinion, policy, regardless of source, should be 
statistically significant.  Instead, only policy originating with state legislatures consistently 
reaches significance. 
6.3 FUTURE RESEARCH 
While my test of reciprocal causality finds no support for the influence of public opinion on 
policy, further tests must be conducted to more fully flesh out the nature of the relationship.  
Specifically, the next step is to run a structural equation model with the same variables in my 
models from Chapter 5.  Structural equation modeling would allow me to model reciprocal 
causality and measure the weight of policy on opinion and vice versa, dealing more directly with 
the endogeneity question.   
Another avenue of future research would be to study the relationship between public 
policy and public opinion through a series of case studies.  I would like to select a case that fits 
each of the four hypotheses I laid out in Chapter 3 (legitimation, backlash, polarization, and no 
relationship between policy and opinion) and utilize process tracing to follow the policy process 
from proposal to adoption to consequences for public opinion, fully taking into account the role 
of interest groups.   
Additionally, I would also like to employ a study that looks at state-level gay rights 
policies that have been adopted and proposed.  While the outcome is not always successful, it is 
possible that the debate surrounding the gay rights policies still influences opinion in systematic 
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ways.  This policy debate can have consequences for public opinion that are not picked up by the 
analysis found here in this dissertation. 
Lastly, I would like to analyze other policy areas in order to determine the extent of 
institutional opinion leadership.  Are state institutions better able to lead opinion on controversial 
issues or mundane issues?  Can state courts lead on a particular set of policies, but not others?  
Can state legislatures lead in other policy areas?   
6.4 CONTRIBUTION AND IMPLICATIONS 
This research is situated among multiple literatures: mass politics, policy studies, and state 
politics.  Regarding mass politics, my dissertation adds a public policy dimension to the sources 
of attitude change.  Antecedents to attitude change are largely believed to originate from social 
and demographic factors, such as familial income level and education levels, but my results show 
that state political context also has an important influence on citizens’ homosexuality attitudes.   
Regarding policy studies, my dissertation shows that it is important to take the policy 
point of origin and its differing impact on attitudes into account.  That is, it is important to note 
whether a policy originates from the state legislature, state judiciary, or the ballot initiative 
process, as each of these origins has differing implications for attitude formation and leadership 
ability.  Additionally, I show that policy has very clear consequences for attitudes and public 
opinion.  Many policy analyses have focused on different types of policy and the cultural 
consequences of those policies.  For example, it is universally understood that certain policies are 
meant to curb crime, increase the welfare of society, and regulate economic conditions.  
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However, much less scholarship has focused on a secondary impact of policy: an attitudinal 
outcome of policy, which is one of the goals of this dissertation.   
Regarding state politics, this research advocates a sub-national approach to analyzing the 
policy-opinion relationship when policy varies at the state-level.  Since most policies about gay 
rights, abortion, the death penalty, and education, for example, are determined at the state level, 
research focusing on public opinion surrounding these policies and their target groups in society 
should also be studied at the state level.  Furthermore, due to their centrality to American 
democracy, the relationship between public policy and public opinion has been intensely debated 
and studied in American political science research.  This dissertation’s contribution is the 
examination of state political structures and, specifically, the various routes by which public 
policy is adopted within the states.   
This dissertation and the theory it promotes also has a number of normative implications 
and consequences.  First, as mentioned above, policy can change public opinion.  More 
specifically and significantly, policies can change what is in the hearts and minds of state 
citizens.   
Second, my theory challenges conventional wisdom regarding the demands of 
democracy.  Representative democracy requires that citizens express their will to the elites who 
then make their constituents’ opinions expressed in policy.  It is widely assumed that legislators 
listen to their constituents’ demands and then vote on bills according to constituent preferences, 
thereby allowing the masses to lead elites.  While many scholars accept this assumption as truth, 
it does not always hold up to rigorous empirical examination.  The issue evolution literature, for 
one, is predicated upon the assumption that elite opinion crystallizes and then masses follow.  
Therefore, in light of Bartels and Mutz (2009) and this project there is reason to believe that 
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policy does not always follow public opinion; under some conditions, policy leads public 
opinion. 
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APPENDIX 
FULL RESULTS FROM TABLES 5.1 AND 5.4 
Table A.1: Fixed Effects Models of Lagged Policy Impact on Individual Homosexuality Attitudes with State 
Dummy Variables Included 
(1) 
FE 
(2) 
2SLS, FE 
(3) 
FE 
(4) 
2SLS, FE 
Total Policyt-1 
0.041 
(0.029) 
0.052** 
(0.018) 
- - 
Policy from 
Legislature t-1 
- 
- 0.060+ 
(0.032) 
0.081*** 
(0.022) 
Policy from Court t-1 - 
- 0.061 
(0.106) 
0.065 
(0.081) 
Policy from Direct 
Democracy t-1 
- 
- -0.035 
(0.040) 
-0.043 
(0.032) 
Year Count 
-0.181*** 
(0.014) 
-0.186 
(0.129) 
-0.191*** 
(0.030) 
-0.197 
(0.131) 
Alabama * Count 
0.203*** 
(0.016) 
0.209 
(0.129) 
0.213*** 
(0.031) 
0.220+ 
(0.131) 
Alaska * Count 
0.176*** 
(0.025) 
0.186 
(0.145) 
0.187*** 
(0.036) 
0.199 
(0.147) 
Arizona * Count 
0.249*** 
(0.014) 
0.254* 
(0.129) 
0.259*** 
(0.030) 
0.264* 
(0.131) 
Arkansas * Count 
0.171*** 
(0.017) 
0.177 
(0.129) 
0.177*** 
(0.030) 
0.184 
(0.131) 
California * Count 
0.213*** 
(0.011) 
0.217+ 
(0.129) 
0.220*** 
(0.025) 
0.224+ 
(0.130) 
Colorado * Count 
0.245*** 
(0.015) 
0.251+ 
(0.129) 
0.255*** 
(0.030) 
0.261* 
(0.131) 
Connecticut * Count 
0.204*** 
(0.010) 
0.208 
(0.129) 
0.211*** 
(0.026) 
0.214 
(0.130) 
Delaware * Count 
0.141*** 
(0.013) 
0.146 
(0.134) 
0.150*** 
(0.023) 
0.156 
(0.135) 
Florida * Count 
0.214*** 
(0.014) 
0.219+ 
(0.129) 
0.223*** 
(0.030) 
0.229+ 
(0.131) 
Georgia * Count 
0.207*** 
(0.018) 
0.214+ 
(0.129) 
0.216*** 
(0.031) 
0.224+ 
(0.131) 
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Table A.1 (continued) 
 
Hawaii * Count 
0.397*** 
(0.014) 
0.402* 
(0.192) 
0.406*** 
(0.030) 
0.413* 
(0.193) 
Idaho * Count 
0.142*** 
(0.014) 
0.147 
(0.145) 
0.142*** 
(0.030) 
0.146 
(0.147) 
Illinois * Count 
0.214*** 
(0.012) 
0.218+ 
(0.129) 
0.222*** 
(0.024) 
0.227+ 
(0.130) 
Indiana * Count 
0.206*** 
(0.015) 
0.212 
(0.129) 
0.216*** 
(0.029) 
0.223+ 
(0.130) 
Iowa * Count 
0.202*** 
(0.014) 
0.207 
(0.129) 
0.211*** 
(0.030) 
0.217+ 
(0.131) 
Kansas * Count 
0.242*** 
(0.016) 
0.248+ 
(0.129) 
0.249*** 
(0.030) 
0.255+ 
(0.131) 
Kentucky * Count 
0.196*** 
(0.015) 
0.202 
(0.129) 
0.205*** 
(0.030) 
0.211 
(0.131) 
Louisiana * Count 
0.204*** 
(0.016) 
0.210 
(0.129) 
0.212*** 
(0.030) 
0.219+ 
(0.131) 
Maryland * Count 
0.222*** 
(0.012) 
0.227+ 
(0.129) 
0.231*** 
(0.029) 
0.235+ 
(0.131) 
Massachusetts * Count 
0.219*** 
(0.008) 
0.222+ 
(0.129) 
0.224*** 
(0.015) 
0.228+ 
(0.129) 
Michigan * Count 
0.220*** 
(0.017) 
0.226+ 
(0.129) 
0.227*** 
(0.031) 
0.234+ 
(0.131) 
Minnesota * Count 
0.260*** 
(0.012) 
0.265* 
(0.129) 
0.269*** 
(0.029) 
0.274* 
(0.131) 
Mississippi * Count 
0.217*** 
(0.017) 
0.224+ 
(0.130) 
0.229*** 
(0.032) 
0.237+ 
(0.132) 
Missouri * Count 
0.205*** 
(0.015) 
0.211 
(0.129) 
0.214*** 
(0.030) 
0.220+ 
(0.131) 
Montana * Count 
0.201*** 
(0.018) 
0.208 
(0.130) 
0.213*** 
(0.032) 
0.222+ 
(0.132) 
New Hampshire * 
Count 
0.383*** 
(0.025) 
0.393** 
(0.144) 
0.400*** 
(0.057) 
0.410** 
(0.150) 
New Jersey * Count 
0.227*** 
(0.009) 
0.230+ 
(0.129) 
0.233*** 
(0.021) 
0.236+ 
(0.130) 
New Mexico * Count 
0.227*** 
(0.014) 
0.233 
(0.180) 
0.237*** 
(0.030) 
0.243 
(0.182) 
New York * Count 
0.211*** 
(0.011) 
0.216+ 
(0.129) 
0.219*** 
(0.023) 
0.223+ 
(0.130) 
North Carolina * 
Count 
0.202*** 
(0.016) 
0.208 
(0.129) 
0.213*** 
(0.031) 
0.220+ 
(0.131) 
North Dakota * Count 
0.245*** 
(0.016) 
0.251+ 
(0.130) 
0.256*** 
(0.031) 
0.263* 
(0.132) 
Ohio * Count 
0.228*** 
(0.020) 
0.236+ 
(0.129) 
0.235*** 
(0.036) 
0.242+ 
(0.131) 
Oklahoma * Count 
0.202*** 
(0.015) 
0.208 
(0.129) 
0.212*** 
(0.030) 
0.218+ 
(0.131) 
Oregon * Count 
0.201*** 
(0.012) 
0.206 
(0.129) 
0.208*** 
(0.029) 
0.213 
(0.131) 
Pennsylvania * Count 
0.211*** 
(0.015) 
0.217+ 
(0.129) 
0.221*** 
(0.030) 
0.228+ 
(0.131) 
Rhode Island * Count 
0.131*** 
(0.014) 
0.137 
(0.146) 
0.141*** 
(0.030) 
0.147 
(0.148) 
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South Carolina * 
Count 
0.218*** 
(0.016) 
0.224+ 
(0.129) 
0.227*** 
(0.031) 
0.234+ 
(0.131) 
South Dakota * Count 
0.205*** 
(0.019) 
0.213 
(0.143) 
0.219*** 
(0.033) 
0.228 
(0.144) 
Tennessee * Count 
0.199*** 
(0.015) 
0.204 
(0.129) 
0.208*** 
(0.030) 
0.214 
(0.131) 
Texas * Count 
0.208*** 
(0.015) 
0.214+ 
(0.129) 
0.217*** 
(0.030) 
0.223+ 
(0.131) 
Utah * Count 
0.237*** 
(0.014) 
0.243+ 
(0.142) 
0.247*** 
(0.030) 
0.253+ 
(0.144) 
Vermont * Count 
0.318*** 
(0.012) 
0.323* 
(0.137) 
0.326*** 
(0.017) 
0.333* 
(0.138) 
Virginia * Count 
0.219*** 
(0.017) 
0.226+ 
(0.129) 
0.230*** 
(0.031) 
0.237+ 
(0.131) 
Washington * Count 
0.206*** 
(0.014) 
0.211 
(0.129) 
0.216*** 
(0.030) 
0.221+ 
(0.131) 
West Virginia * Count 
0.219*** 
(0.016) 
0.225+ 
(0.129) 
0.230*** 
(0.031) 
0.237+ 
(0.131) 
Wisconsin * Count 
0.207*** 
(0.014) 
0.212+ 
(0.129) 
0.215*** 
(0.035) 
0.219+ 
(0.131) 
Wyoming * Count 
0.213*** 
(0.014) 
0.219+ 
(0.129) 
0.223*** 
(0.030) 
0.229+ 
(0.131) 
Constant 
1.592*** 
(0.001) 
1.593*** 
(0.013) 
1.596*** 
(0.005) 
1.597*** 
(0.014) 
     
Observations 30176 28759 30176 30176 
Groups 48 48 48 48 
Min Obs per Group 37 37 37 37 
Avg Obs per Group 628.7 599.1 628.7 628.7 
Max Obs per Group 2938 2782 2938 2938 
Wald χ2 (49, 51) - 68730.25 - 72113.96 
Prob > Wald χ2 - 0.000 - 0.000 
Corr (u_i, Xb) -0.396 -0.423 -0.422 -0.435 
Within R
2
 0.045 0.044 0.045 0.045 
Between R
2
 0.014 0.012 0.011 0.011 
Overall R
2
 0.033 0.031 0.031 0.031 
sigma_u 0.916 0.944 0.945 0.961 
sigma_e 1.176 1.184 1.176 1.176 
rho 0.377 0.389 0.392 0.400 
F test (47, 30077) - 13.65 - 13.99 
Prob > F - 0.000 - 0.000 
For comparison purposes, Maine is the omitted state. 
No observations in Nebraska or Nevada. 
Standard errors in parentheses 
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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